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In recent years, a widespread assumption has developed in many
quarters that the best way to protect consumers under the antitrust
laws is through novel procedural devices which would permit very
large numbers of small damage claims to be asserted in massive law-
suits. This view has been reflected in proposals for parens patriac
and fluid class actions which have been rejected by the courts, but
which are now being considered by the Congress as part of two pend-
ing antitrust bills of immense potential importance.'
As we shall show, the history of the parens patriae and fluid class
innovations and a consideration of how they will function in practice
suggest that this approach will neither confer significant benefits on
consumers nor provide a workable deterrent for enforcing the anti-
trust laws in their interest.2 Therefore, the time has come to consider
alternative means for realizing these objectives. Indeed, a great deal
can and should be done to guide and improve antitrust enforcement
efforts so that they will produce far more economic benefit for con-
sumers than is the case today.
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Barry Schwartz in the
preparation of this article.
t Professor of Law Emeritus, Columbia University Law School; Member of N.Y. Bar.
-- Member of N.Y. Bar.
1. The bills are H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975), introduced by Representative
Rodino, and its Senate counterpart, S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 401-05 (1975),
sponsored by Senators Hart and Scott. The Rodino bill has been passed by the House.
See 756 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-1 (1976). The Hart and Scott bill has
been reported out of the Judiciary Committee as part of the Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1975.
2. The senior author has commented on this legislation on several previous occasions.
See Hearings on the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975 Before the Subcomm. on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 291-306
(1975) (testimony of Milton Handler); Address by Milton Handler, Antitrust-The Scape-
goat for The Nation's Ills, Meeting of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, No. 18, 1975 (on file with Yale Law Journal). Several of the arguments put forth
in this article were summarized in Handler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an Infla-
tionary Era, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 211, 252-56 (1975).
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I. The Search for a Procedural Panacea
The effort to develop a procedural device for asserting small in-
dividual antitrust claims on behalf of massive groups of consumers
had its initial impetus in the 1966 amendments to Rule 23. Prior
to that time, a class action for treble damages was in effect a per-
missive joinder device which required affirmative action by any class
member wishing to be represented in the lawsuit.3 By virtue of the
1966 amendments, however, each person within the category defined
by the plaintiff in his complaint automatically became a member of
a litigating class unless he took the steps required by law to "opt
out." 4 Thus, the consumer who had little or no financial stake in
a lawsuit and who was therefore unlikely to take any action at all
would, for that very reason, be included in the class. Consequently,
a plaintiff's counsel could purport to represent very large classes with
aggregate claims of astronomical dimension simply by drafting ap-
propriate language in a pleading. It is doubtful that the draftsmen
intended or even contemplated such results.5 Nevertheless, these new
possibilities under Rule 23 led to the commencement of suits al-
leging such prodigious classes as 11, million purchasers of bread in
Philadelphia, 6 tens of millions of retail purchasers of gasoline in var-
ious states, 7 20 to 40 million buyers of General Motors automobiles,"
40 million hotel customers,9 all homeowners in the United States, 10
all consumers of eggs in the United States," and even all 200 million
or more persons in the United States.'
2
3. See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rules, FED. R. Civ. P.
23, 28 U.S.C. app., at 7765 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Note]; 3B
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE , 23.10[l], 23.12 (2d ed. 1975); Kaplan, Continuing Work of
the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81
HARV. L. Rv. 356, 376, 383-85 (1967).
4. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 23(c)(3); Advisory Committee Note, supra note 3, at 7767-68.
5. The Advisory Committee's Note on Rule 23 indicates uncertainty as to whether
class actions are appropriate in antitrust cases at all, let alone in the context of treble
damage actions brought on behalf of millions of consumers. It states that "[p]rivate
damage claims by numerous individuals arising out of concerted antitrust violations may
or may not involve predominating common questions." Advisory Committee Note, supra
note 3, at 7767. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 393.
6. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. f" 73,879 (E.D. Pa. 1970), appeal
dismissed, 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
7. City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971).
8. Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Il1. 1973).
9. In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974).
10. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50
F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), all'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971).
11. United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
12. In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal.
1970), af 'd, rev'd & remanded in part, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
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As a seeming procedural key for opening up the federal courts to
millions of aggrieved consumers, the class action was hailed as "one
of the most socially useful remedies in history."'13 In fact, however,
the reality never came close to matching the promise of this supposed
panacea. As noted by Judge Medina in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
"not a single one of these class actions including millions of indis-
criminate and unidentifiable members has ever been brought to trial
and decided on the merits."' 4 In some instances consumers were found
to have suffered no compensable injury.'3 In other instances the courts
refused to certify classes because, among other defects, the sheer bur-
den of processing millions of small claims through discovery and trial
rendered the actions unmanageable.16 What is more, the supposed
1045 (1973). The subsequent decision in the multidistrict proceedings is reported at 367
F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
13. Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been
Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAW 1259, 1259 (1970). See Ash, The Class Action: Solution for the
Seventies, 7 NEW ENGLAND L. REv. 1 (1971); Berger, Class Actions, 77 CASE & Co,t., Jan.-
Feb. 1972, at 26; Freeman, Class Actions From the Plaintiffs' Viewpoint, 38 J. AIR. L. 8
Com. 401, 402-3 (1972); Kohn, The Antitrust Class Action As a Social Instrument, 41
ANrrITRUST L.J. 280 (1972).
14. 479 F.2d 1005, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). To our knowl-
edge, Judge Medina's observation is still valid.
15. See, e.g., In re Multidist. Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub norn. Mangano v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); United Egg Producers
v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
16. See, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 89-92 (9th Cir. 1974) (court
calculated that adjudicating claims of even 10% of class of 40 million hotel guests would
take approximately 100 years); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 599-601
(N.D. Ill. 1973) (class of 30 to 40 million automobile purchasers); Cotchett v. Avis Rent
A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 553-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (class of over 500,000 consumers
who paid a surcharge when renting an automobile from defendant car rental agencies);
Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 64-74 (D.N.J. 1971) (class of six million
retail consumers of gasoline in Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania); Reinisch v.
NYSE, 52 F.R.D. 561, 563-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (class of over 20 million stockholders); Hackett
v. General Host Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 73,879, at 91,663, 91,664-65 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
appeal dismissed, 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972) (class of 1
million bread purchasers).
Other grounds that have been relied upon by the courts in rejecting consumer class
actions have included: (1) the inadequacy of the plaintiff or his counsel as class repre-
sentative, e.g., Lidie v. California, 478 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1973); Graybeal v. American
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1973) (plaintiffs' dual roles as attorneys for
and representatives of the class found to be in conflict); United Egg Producers v. Bauer
Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (class representative found to have
"conflicting and divided [economic] interest"); (2) a lack of predominance of common
questions, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, supra at 88-90; Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car
Sys., Inc., supra at 551-52; and (3) failure to provide the superior method for resolving
the dispute in question, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 757-63 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (collateral estoppel found to be superior to class action
in Truth-in-Lending case where class treatment would compel defendant to assert com-
pulsory counterclaims for debts owed by holders); Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan
Ass'n, supra at 16 (class action certification would "spawn a proliferation of subclasses").
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benefits to individual consumers were often so inconsequential that
in the view of some courts the attorneys rather than the class members
constituted the real parties in interest.17
In an effort to meet some of these problems, state parens patriae
suits were introduced to the antitrust landscape in the early 1970's.1s
Actually, two distinct kinds of parens patriae claims were asserted
under quite different legal theories. In the first category, the states
sought to extend their traditional powers to protect the interest of
idiots, lunatics, and other incompetents by purporting to sue on be-
half of their consumer-citizens allegedly injured by a claimed anti-
trust violation.19 The purpose of this kind of action was to allow
the states to keep for their own use any unclaimed damages that might
be recovered on the consumers' behalf.20 Since this procedural in-
17. See, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974). In this case the
parties agreed that the financial stake of each class member in the litigation was only
$2 per person, a fact which prompted the court to state:
In view of the nonexistent, or minuscule, recoveries that are likely to accrue to the
supposedly intended beneficiaries, it is not surprising that most of the named plain-
tiffs are attorneys acting as counsel for themselves. . . . [T]his action has been
primarily generated and financially supported by the lawyers who possibly stand to
realize astronomical fees, and not by the individuals whose potential claims in any
event are de minimis....
Id. at 91. See also Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 553-54 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
18. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969), revrd, 431
F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (California and
Kansas); City of Philadephia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 48, 67 (D.N.J. 1971)
(New Jersey); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Cali-
fornia, Hawaii, Kansas, Oregon, Utah, and Washington); In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollu-
tion Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398, 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), affd in part, rev'd & remanded
in part on other grounds, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973) (New
Jerey, Illinois, and New York); California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 977 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
The initial impetus for these parens patriae antitrust suits was probably in large part
judicial approval of a settlement device agreed to by various defendant drug companies
in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). Under this plan, the states were to be
used as conduits for consumer recoveries, settling the claims of the states as parens
patriae on behalf of their citizens. 314 F. Supp. at 722-23, 728.
19. This was the type of parens patriae claim originally asserted in Hawaii v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982, 984 nA (D. Hawaii 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 431
F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972). See note 21 infra. For additional
cases, see In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398, 401 (C.D. Cal.
1970), aff'd in part, rev'd & remanded in part on other grounds, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 977 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); Philadelphia
Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Pa.
1969). The historical roots of this branch of parens patriae in the powers of the English
King to protect the rights of incompetents are traced in Malina & Blechman, Parens
Patriae Suits for Treble Damages under the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U. L. REv. 193, 197-
202, 212-19 (1970).
20. The states had been allowed to keep unclaimed damages in a settlement in West
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novation circumvented all of the safeguards of Rule 23, it not sur-
prisingly received short shrift in the courts.2' Moreover, just as the
appointment of a guardian ad litem does not change the substantive
rights of an incompetent party,2 2 this type of parens patriae could
not in any event obviate the need to prove individual injury to each
consumer on whose behalf suit was brought.
To overcome this obstacle, a second type of parens patriae action
was devised which attempted to avoid the need for proving damages
to individuals by relying instead on putative injury to the so-called
general economy of the state itself.23 This second category of parens
patriae was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Hawaii v. Standard Oil
of California24 on the ground that the "general economy" of a state
is an "abstraction" which the court doubted could be the subject of
independent harm. The Supreme Court affirmed, pointing out, among
other things, that "[a] large and ultimately indeterminable part of
the injury to the 'general economy' . . . is no more than a reflection
of injuries to the 'business or property' of consumers .... ,,2r
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af 'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). In California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 776
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973), California, as parens patriae, sought to
recover on behalf of its 20 million consumers of snack foods. The court pointed out
that "[t]he state [was] looking beyond recovery for injuries to its citizens to its own
ultimate acquisition of the recoveries obtained."
21. See California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1973) (expressing concern over the need for procedural safeguards); In re Motor Vehicle
Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398, 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd &
remanded in part on other grounds, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045
(1973); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 309
F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (parens patriae suits would lack the procedural safeguards
provided by Rule 23). Even in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii
1969), rev'd, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), afj'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972), where the district
court initially approved the state's parens patriae claims based on an alleged injury to
the economy of Hawaii as a whole, Judge Pence rejected parens patriae claims for injury
to its individual consumers. He noted and reaffirmed this unreported decision at 301
F. Supp. at 984 n.4, 986-87. Indeed, to the extent that Judge Pence approved Hawaii's
parens patriae claims, he stressed that he was doing so on the basis that the alleged
injury was separate and apart from that of the state's consumers. 301 F. Supp. at 986-88.
22. "A guardian ad litem is a fiduciary whose scope is very limited .... His functions
are [only] to provide counsel for his ward and see that the ward's rights are protected
in the conduct of the suit." 25 N.Y. JUR., Guardian & Ward § 76, at 339 (1962).
23. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969), rev'd, 431 F.2d
1282 (9th Cir. 1970), affd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972), where Hawaii included this type of parens
patriae claim in its fourth amended complaint, after the court had dismissed its cause of
action based on the first type of parens patriae involving claims for injury to its in-
dividual consumers. This second type of parens patriae, arising out of the nature of the
federal system, is discussed in Malina & Blechman, supra note 19, at 202-12.
24. 431 F.2d 1282, 1285 (9th Cir. 1970), ajf'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
25. 405 U.S. at 264. After the Supreme Court's decision in the case, Hawaii settled
with the oil company defendants, dismissing the suit in return for the defendants' pay-
ment of the $185,000 in attorneys' fees incurred in four years of litigation. See 593
ANTITRUST & TRADE RrG. REP. (BNA) A-18 (1972).
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The final judicial innovation for circumventing the .problems of
asserting treble damage claims based on supposed injuries to con-
sumers was the "fluid class" device proposed by the plaintiff and ac-
cepted by the district court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.2 1 That
case involved an alleged class of some 6 million odd-lot traders on the
New York Stock Exchange who were estimated to have been over-
charged an average of $1.30 per class member for brokerage services
during the relevant period.2 7 As might have been expected in view
of the modest stakes involved for each individual investor, "[n]o
claimant in the six years of the progress of the action had shown
any interest in Eisen's claim."2-
The district court had initially held the class action unmanageable
because of the large size of the class and the minuscule size of the
individual claims.2 9 On remand from the court of appeals,3 0 it adopted
a "fluid recovery" procedure under which damages would be awarded
in the aggregate to "the class as a whole."-"1 Those persons actually
injured and wishing to file claims (which were expected to be rela-
tively few in number) were to be paid out of the fund created by
the aggregate damage recovery. The remainder of the fund would
be disbursed by reducing future odd-lot brokerage fees by some ju-
dicially set amount until the fund was depleted-in effect distributing
the "excess" damage recovery to future odd-lot purchasers, regardless
of whether or not such persons had bought during the alleged con-
spiracy and therefore even arguably had suffered some injury.32
The Second Circuit rejected this innovation, not merely because
of the violence it did to Rule 23, but also "as an unconstitutional
violation of the requirement of due process of law. ' 33 If constitu-
tional requirements were observed, the court noted, the alleged class
would be unmanageable and the costs of processing individual claims
would render the amounts payable to individual class members "so
low as to be negligible.
'3 4
26. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417
U.S. 156 (1974). The class action determination in this litigation had a long and tangled
history. See, e.g., Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 97, 100-03.
27. 479 F.2d at 1010.
28. Id.
29. 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
30. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the class and remanded
the case for an evidentiary hearing "on the questions of notice, adequate representation,
effective administration of the action," and other matters deemed proper. 391 F.2d 555,
570 (2d Cir. 1968).
31. 52 F.R.D. at 264.
32. Id. at 264-65.
33. 479 F.2d at 1018.
34. Id. at 1017. The Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit's decision, but limited
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Having come to a dead end in the courts, the search for a pro-
cedure to vindicate small consumer claims in antitrust suits moved
to the Congress. One bill recently passed by the House and another
presently pending in the Senate would adopt through legislation the
devices of parens patriae and fluid class suits rejected in the courts.3
The proposed legislation would empower the attorney general of any
state to bring parens patriae suits for damages sustained by natural
persons residing in the state.36 The bills further provide that in parens
patriae suits asserting the individual damage claims of state residents,
"damages may be proved and assessed in the aggregate" using unspec-
ified statistical, sampling, and other estimating methods; while the
Senate bill would extend this provision to all class actions brought
under the antitrust laws on behalf of natural persons, the correspond-
ing section of the House bill is limited to class actions brought by
states.37 Neither bill indicates what is to happen in class actions after
such an "aggregate" damage fund is created. The legislation does pro-
vide, however, that in parens patriae suits the court shall have dis-
cretion to dictate a method of distribution unless a method is speci-
fied by state law, with the caveat that each of the purportedly injured
its discussion to the narrow ground of notice. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The Court held that
individual notice had to be sent to all class members who could be identified through
reasonable efforts, and that the cost of such notice-estimated at S315,000-had to be
borne by the plaintiff. Since Eisen's own financial stake in the lawsuit was at most $70,
as a practical matter this ruling marked the end of the lawsuit as a class action. For a
discussion of the ethical problems of having counsel pay the costs of notice where it is
uneconomical for plaintiff himself to do so, see Robinson, Recent Antitrust Develop.
ments-1974, 30 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 142, 169-71 (1975).
35. H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975); S. 1284, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 401-05
(1975). See note 1 supra.
36. H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(4C)(a) (1975), provides:
Any State attorney general may bring a civil action, in the name of the State, in the
district courts of the United States under section 4 of [the Clayton] Act, and such
State shall be entitled to recover threefold the damages and the cost of suit, in-
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons
residing in such State injured by any violation of the Sherman Act.
Similarly, S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(4C)(a)(1) (1975), states:
Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the name of such State
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the defendant, to
secure monetary and other relief as provided in this section in respect of any damage
sustained, by reason of the defendant's having done anything forbidden in the
Sherman Act, by-
(A) the natural persons residing in such State, or any of them ....
In addition, under the House bill, a parens patriae action initially brought on behalf of
natural persons could be converted into a class action. In such a class action the state
attorney general could conceivably represent a class of plaintiffs including business en-
tities and natural persons if they both had been injured in exactly the same manner.
See H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(4C)(b) (1975); HousE CoMNua. ON THE JUDICIARY,
REPORT ON ANTITRUST PARENS PATRIAE Aar, H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 REPORT].
37. See H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(4D) (1975); S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 401(4C)(c)(1) (1975).
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natural persons on whose behalf suit was brought shall have a rea-
sonable opportunity to secure his "appropriate portion" of the fund.3
Thus, the pending legislation would permit precisely the kind of "fluid
recovery" procedure which the Second Circuit rejected in Eisen.
The foregoing history suggests that the development of the fluid
recovery and parens patriae devices has been predicated upon certain
assumptions of questionable validity. The first is that the problems of
proof of injury and manageability which render consumer class ac-
tions unworkable are mere technical difficulties that may be overcome
by legal ingenuity. Supporters of the proposed legislation seem to as-
sume that judicial rejection of parens patriae and fluid classes has
been based on precedential or doctrinal grounds that may be legis-
latively overruled. 39 A second, more important assumption helps ex-
plain the persistent conviction that, despite all problems, some means
must be found to provide an effective consumer treble damage remedy.
This is the view that, in any given case, the defendants have gouged
the public and wrongfully extracted from consumers a "pot of gold"
which now lies secreted in their corporate coffers. 40 It is assumed that
justice requires that some way be found to get the consumer back
his money or, if that is impossible, at least to make the defendants
disgorge their illegal profits and deter others from similar violations.
In order to determine the extent to which these assumptions are
justified, it is useful to consider how the proposed legislation will
38. H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(4E) (1975); S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401
(4C)(c)(2) (1975).
39. See, e.g., 1975 REPORT, supra note 36, at 8:
The thrust of the bill is to overturn [California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973)] by allowing State attorneys general to act as
consumer advocates in the enforcement process, while at the same time avoiding the
problems of manageability which some courts have found under Rule 23.
The debates before the entire House reveal the same attitude. Representative Badillo,
for example, was firmly of the view that "this legislation clarifies what had been the
law until the recently held Frito-Lay case." 122 CONG. RLC. H2067 (daily ed. Mar. 18,
1976). He stated:
The Supreme Court long ago recognized that States, in the person of their highest
legal officer, could sue as parens patriae on behalf of consumers within that State
for injunctive and other equitable remedies. These suits naturally included injuries
sustained by the consumer as a result of illegal price fixing and other antitrust
violations.
Id. In fact, parens pariae has been rejected on every occasion in which it has been
asserted in an antitrust context, with the sole exception of Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
324 U.S. 439 (1945), which was emphatically not a suit brought on behalf of consumers.
The Georgia case was an action to vindicate the quasi-sovereign interests of Georgia
itself in putting an end to a conspiracy to discriminate in favor of the ports of sister
states, i.e., a conspiracy aimed at the state as such. See Malina & Blechman, supra note
19, at 210-12. The courts have been unanimous in rejecting supposed quasi-sovereign
patens patriae actions that are really for the benefit of individual citizens such as
consumers. See id.
40. See, e.g., In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y.
633
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actually work when applied to the kinds of antitrust violations that
are occurring in the economy today. In order to do this, we have
examined the Commerce Clearing House Reports for the past five years
describing the 346 civil and criminal actions commenced during that
time by the Department of Justice.41 These Reports provide a unique
source of information about the suits brought by the Government
(which, in turn, reflect the Antitrust Division's perception of existing
violations warranting government action). Moreover, the Reports con-
stitute the best available universe for any statistical study of antitrust
enforcement. 42 This body of data is particularly relevant for present
purposes since the proponents of the pending parens patriae bills
themselves rely upon the record of recent Justice Department actions
1971); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 479 F.2d
1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). That this same preconception is shared
by the proponents of the pending legislation is readily apparent in Hearings on Anti-
trust Parens Patriae Amendments Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter 1975
Hearings on Parens Patriae Amendments]. For example, the sponsor of the House bill,
Representative Rodino, rhetorically asked a witness:
[W]ould you agree that in order to Teach some of these actions that are being taken
that either go unchallenged or unchecked and where you cannot employ the class
action and there is this price fixing and this conspiracy and someone is enriched
in such a manner that people cannot rest unless there is some attempt to correct
the situation? It distorts the economy, it has an unjust effect on society such that
there ought to be some kind of a vehicle which might be employed, of course, with
all due regard to the necessary constitutional rights being preserved for all parties.
Id. at 53. See id. at 63 (Rep. Railsback's statement to the same witness).
41. 5 TRAE REG. REP. ff, 45,071-75 (1976). This looseleaf service summarizes all anti-
trust complaints, indictments, and informations. It also reports on the progress and
disposition of these suits.
42. See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 365
(1970).
The total statistical universe of government and private antitrust suits would yield
substantially the same results, since treble damage actions tend to follow in the wake of
government actions. For example, of the 880 private antitrust cases commenced during
1961-1963 (the most recent period for which such data are presented to Professor Posner),
759 were preceded by Justice Department judgments. Id. at 372. Indeed, not only
private parties but also states must rely upon the Antitrust Division as the agency
primarily responsible for detecting antitrust violations-a fact which is recognized in the
provisions in the pending bills requiring the Attorney General of the United States to
notify state attorneys general of suits in which the states might have causes of action. See
H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(4F) (1975); S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(4D)
(1975).
The record of private suits also tends to be more misleading from a statistical stand-
point than the record of government prosecutions. As Professor Posner points out:
[A] single antitrust violation may give rise to many private suits, for there is usually
more than one victim of a monopolistic practice. The 2,233 electrical equipment
cases noted in Table 3 arose from a few indictments. One does not know how many
separate violations have been attacked by private suits; it may be only a small
fraction of the total number of private antitrust cases.
Id.
In short, while the record of Justice Department prosecutions may not reflect in their
exact proportions the antitrust violations actually occurring in the economy, there is no
reason to doubt that the general categories of suits brought are representative.
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to prove what they believe to be the need for the remedial legis-
lation.
43
As we examine the cases brought during the last five years, we will
see that the proposed legislation is predicated on a false conception
of the kinds of antitrust violations occurring in the economy, their
impact on consumers, and the likely effects of a parens patriae remedy.
We turn first to the vast majority of cases where antitrust violations
have occurred at levels in the chain of distribution so remote from
consumers as to make it virtually impossible for them either indi-
vidually or as a class to prove that they suffered any compensable
injury at all, much less the amount of their alleged damages. Such
cases are further complicated by the fact that multiple, conflicting
claims are typically asserted by persons at different levels in the chain
of distribution based on the same alleged overcharge. As we shall
show, neither the parens patriae nor fluid recovery devices provide
solutions to the very real problems of proof of injury and manage-
ability presented by these cases.
Next, we will examine the relatively small number of alleged
price-fixing conspiracies in which consumers are directly affected, and
where the new legislation therefore might have an impact. We shall
show that the nature of both the violations and the defendants in-
volved in such cases bears little resemblance to the stereotypes appar-
ently envisioned by the proponents of the pending bills. What is
more, there is a welter of practical, policy, and constitutional ob-
jections which render parens patriae inadequate both as a deterrent
and as a compensatory remedy even in the few cases where it has
potential application.
An analysis of the inadequacies of the proposed legislation, how-
ever, does not solve the problem of how the antitrust laws may best
be enforced to benefit consumers. Therefore, in the final section of
this article, we shall suggest some alternative solutions which we be-
lieve will help to realize the objectives of the pending bills far more
effectively and without the problems raised by parens patriae and
fluid class actions.
II. Antitrust Violations Affecting Consumers Indirectly
It is clear that many of the proponents of parens patriae envision
the typical antitrust violation as a price-fixing conspiracy in which
overcharges are exacted by the defendants in sales to consumers.
44
43. See, e.g., 1975 REPORT, supra note 36, at 4.
44. See, e.g., 751 ANTITRUST &- TRADE REG. REPORT (BNA) A-3 (1976), quoting letter
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In fact, however, of the 346 government cases brought in the past
five years, horizontal price-fixing at the retail level was alleged in
only 45 (by no means all of which actually resulted in overcharges
to consumers45); and the farther one moves from retail price-fixing,
the more problematical and difficult it becomes to prove injury to
consumers.
A. Horizontal Price-Fixing
Even in the general area of horizonal price-fixing, with its typ-
ical element of overcharge, the great majority of government suits
involves conspiracies which affect consumers, if at all, only in a very
indirect manner.46 In most of these- cases the price-fixed item is a
minor component of the product or service that the consumer pur-
chases. For example, many of these suits have involved items such
as gypsum wall board and plaster 47 gas vent pipe,48 plastic pipe fit-
tings, 49 concrete5° and concrete block,51 toilet seats,5 2 and overhead
garage doors53-items which consumers typically acquire only as com-
ponent parts of new or used houses. Similarly, the Department has
charged price-fixing conspiracies affecting zipper sliders,5 4 which con-
from Representative Rodino to House Rules Committee, Feb. 6, 1976; 122 CONG. Rrc.
H2062-63 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1976) (Rep. Rodino).
45. See pp. 659-60 infra. Horizontal price-fixing involves agreements among com-
petitors.
46. Of the 192 horizontal price-fixing cases the Government has brought in the past
five years, 134 involved conspiracies in areas of the private economy far removed from
the consumer. We shall focus on these cases in this section. Another thirteen alleged the
rigging of bids to federal, state, and local governments. To the extent that a government
sells services (such as municipal utilities), the injury to the consumer in these thirteen
cases is much like that resulting from remote violations in the private sector. To the
extent that the overcharge is paid out of general revenues, proof of injury to consumers
as taxpayers may be even more difficult.
47. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 45,073 (Cas. Nos.
2356, 2357) (W.D. Pa., D.D.C. 1975) (dispositions noted); id. I 45,071 (Cas. No. 2204)
(N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 30, 1971).
48 United States v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 45,073 (Cas.
No. 2343) (C.D. Cal. 1973).
49. United States v. R & G Sloane Mfg. Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. I[ 45,071 (Cas. Nos.
2179, 2180) (C.D. Cal., filed June 29, 1971) (dispositions noted).
50. United States v. Monroe, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. If 45,075 (Cas. Nos. 2481-2484)
(D. Idaho, indictment returned Oct. 16, 1975); United States v. Jahncke Serv., Inc., 5
TRADE REG. REP. 45,073 (Gas. No. 2305) (E.D. La. 1973).
51. United States v. Ampress Brick Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 45,073 (Cas. Nos. 2315,
2316) (N.D. Ill., indictment returned Apr. 19, 1973).
52. United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 5 TRADE REG. RrP. I 45,074 (Cas. Nos. 2391,
2392) (E.D. Mich. 1975) (dispositions noted).
53. United States v. Overhead Door Distribs. Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 45,072 (Cas.
Nos. 2211-2214) (E.D. Pa., indictment returned Jan. 27, 1972) (dispositions noted).
54. United States v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 5 TRADE: REG. REP. If 45,074 (Cas. Nos.
2407, 2408) (S.D.N.Y., indictment returned Sept. 10, 1974) (dispositions noted).
Antitrust and the Consumer Interest
sumers ultimately acquire as part of the clothing they purchase, 55 and
paper labels, which are put on some bottles and cans and thus pur-
chased as a minor incident to food and beverages .56 Even further re-
moved from consumers are the conspiracies charged by the Govern-
ment affecting the prices of, for example, diamond grit used for
industrial grinding,5 7 chromite sand used to make molds for steel
ingot,58 nylon netting used for shrimp and salmon fishing,59 and
chemicals used to make plastics60 and herbicides, 61 all of which have
only the most speculative effect on the prices of goods or services
actually sold to consumers. -6 2 On the other hand, in another group
of cases involving local price-fixing conspiracies by wholesalers of
bread,63 dairy products, 64 meat, 65 eggs, 66 and produce, 67 consumers
do purchase the price-fixed items as such, but only after they have
been bought and sold at one or more intervening levels in the chain
of distribution.
55. For a brief description of the chain of distribution of zipper sliders, see Judge
Carter's opinion in Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Co., 395 F. Supp. 287, 289
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
56. United States v. H.S. Crocker Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. f 45,074 (Cas. Nos. 2372-2374)
(N.D. Cal., indictment returned Mar. 12, 1974); United States v. Litton Business Sys.,
Inc., 5 TRADE: REG. REP. 45,074 (Cas. No. 2388) (N.D. Cal., filed June 7, 1974) (disposi-
tions noted).
57. United States v. DeBeers Indus. Diamond Div., Ltd., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,074
(Cas. Nos. 2425, 2426) (S.D.N.Y., indictment returned Dec. 10, 1974).
58. United States v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 5 TrADE REG. REP. jJ 45,073 (Cas. Nos.
2348, 2349) (E.D. Pa. 1974) (dispositions noted).
59. United States v. Brownell & Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,072 (Cas. Nos. 2289-2293)
(N.D. Ala. 1973, 1974; W.D. Tenn. 1973, 1976) (dispositions noted).
60. United States v. FMC Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. IT 45,075 (Cas. Nos. 2446, 2447) (D.
Mass., indictment returned Mar. 21, 1975).
61. United States v. American Hoechst Corp., 5 TRADE REc. REP. F1 45,075 (Cas. No.
2457) (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (disposition noted).
62. See, e.g., note 77 infra.
63. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,075 (Cas.
Nos. 2465, 2466) (S.D. Cal., indictment returned June 24, 1975) (disposition noted);
United States v. Kahn's Bakery, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. fT 45,075 (Cas. Nos. 2455, 2456)
(W.D. Tex. 1975) (dispositions noted); United States v. Ideal Baking Co., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. r, 45,075 (Cas. Nos. 2433A-2440) (E.D. La., indictment returned Feb. 28, 1975) (dis-
positions noted); United States v. Rainbo Baking Co., 5 TRAi.o REG.. RrP. I 45,074 (Cas.
Nos. 2368, 2369) (D. Ariz. 1974) (dispositions noted); United States v. Gonuella Baking
Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ' 45,072 (Cas. Nos. 2280, 2281) (N.D. 111. 1972) (dispositions
noted); United States v. Sweetheart Bakers, Inc., 5 TRADE RLG. REp. IT 45,071 (Cas. Nos.
2182-2185) (D. Md. 1972) (dispositions noted).
64. United States v. Borden, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 1r 45,074 (Cas. Nos. 2402, 2403)
(D. Ariz. 1974) (dispositions noted); United States v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 5 TRADe REG.
REP. IT 45,071 (Cas. Nos. 2189, 2190) (W.D. Wash. 1972) (dispositions noted).
65. United States v. Blue Ribbon Meat Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. IT 45,072 (Cas. Nos.
2278, 2279) (D. Nev., filed Sept. 12, 1972) (dispositions noted).
66. United States v. Countryside Farms, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. f 45,075 (Cas. Nos.
2470, 2471) (D. Utah, indictment returned July 28, 1975).
67. United States v. A. Levy & J. Zentner Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. jf 45,072 (Cas. Nos.
2274, 2275) (D. Nev., indictment returned Aug. 15, 1972) (dispositions noted).
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1. The Problem of Proving Pass-On
The problem in all of the situations in which the consumer does
not deal directly with an alleged price-fixer is that he cannot estab-
lish a claim merely by proving that an antitrust violation has oc-
curred; rather, in order to show that he has been injured, the con-
sumer must also demonstrate that an overcharge reached him by
being passed from one level to another in the chain of distribution.
The extreme (indeed, insuperable) difficulty of providing adequate
proof of the pass-on of an overcharge was articulated by Justice White
in his now classic opinion in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United States
Shoe Machinery Corp.5 The plaintiff in that case was a shoe com-
pany which claimed that the defendant's unlawful policy of leas-
ing, as opposed to selling, its shoe manufacturing machinery had
raised the total cost plaintiff paid for use of the machinery in ques-
tion.6 9 By way of defense, the defendant argued that the plaintiff
had suffered no injury since it had "passed-on" any overcharge to
its own customers by increasing the prices at which it sold shoes.
In rejecting this defense, the Court stressed the virtual impossi-
bility of establishing a causal link between an overcharge incurred
by a business in acquiring supplies or equipment and the pricing
decisions of that company's executives in the different and presumably
competitive market in which it sells. Justice White noted:
Normally the impact of a single change in the relevant conditions
cannot be measured after the fact; indeed a businessman may be
unable to state whether, had one fact been different (a single
supply less expensive, general economic conditions more buoyant,
or the labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen
a different price.70
Indeed, even in the best possible circumstances, where "it could be
shown that the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the
amount of, the overcharge," it would still be impossible to prove
68. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
69. In an earlier government suit, United had been found to have monopolized the
market for shoe manufacturing machinery. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). The Supreme
Court agreed with plaintiff Hanover Shoe that United's practice of leasing and refusing
to sell its major machines had been held illegal in this prior suit, making the prior judg-
ment prima facie evidence of liability under § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a)
(Supp. IV 1974). 392 U.S. at 483-87. Hanover Shoe claimed damages measured by the
difference between what it paid the defendant for leasing the machines and the price it
would have paid had it been able to purchase them.
70. Id. at 492-93.
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that the buyer's price increase represented the pass-on of that over-
charge since
there would remain the nearly insuperable difficulty of demon-
strating that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have
raised his prices absent the overcharge or maintained the higher
price had the overcharge been discontinued. 71
In short, in what the Supreme Court referred to as "the real eco-
nomic world rather than an economist's hypothetical model," 72 it is
inherently impossible to reconstruct with any reasonable certainty the
subjective dynamics of a past pricing decision, much less determine
what that decision would have been if a particular input had been
less expensive. In his opinion Justice White recognized only one ex-
ception to this general rule-the case of preexisting cost-plus contracts
and like arrangements where the impact of a single cost item on price
can be determined with mathematical certainty without regard to mar-
ket conditions and without inquiry into the mental processes of indi-
vidual businessmen seeking to evaluate the subtle play of economic
forces.7
3
Some two years later, the same "insuperable" evidentiary obstacles
which had led Justice White to reject a claim of pass-on by way of
defense were relied on by Judge Lord in dismissing the claims of an
alleged homeowner class in the Plumbing Fixtures litigation.7 4 The
defendant manufacturers in that case were charged with price-fixing
on tubs, toilets, sinks, and similar items. In order to recover, how-
ever, a member of the homeowner class would have had to prove:
(1) that, because of the conspiracy, the plumbing fixtures ultimately
installed in his house had been sold by a defendant to a wholesaler
at a price that included an overcharge; (2) that the wholesaler had
passed on part of the overcharge by selling the fixtures to a plumbing
contractor at an inflated price; (3) that some of the overcharge was
71. Id. at 493.
72. Id.
73. [Tihere might be situations-for instance, when an overcharged buyer has a
pre-existing "cost plus" contract, thus making it easy to prove that he has not been
damaged-where the considerations requiring that the passing-on defense not be
permitted in this case would not be present.
rd. at 494.
74. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50
F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), af'd sub non. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971). This case was followed in Philadelphia
Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 381 (E.D.
Pa. 1970) (dismissing claims of public bodies which had purchased plumbing fixtures
from intervening sellers).
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again passed on in the bid for the combined package of labor and
materials that the plumbing contractor submitted to the builder; and
(4) that the price at which the builder sold the class member his
home also contained an overcharge. Those homeowner claimants that
had bought used rather than new homes would in addition have had
to show that each time their houses changed hands the purchase price
was inflated by some part of the amount by which the defendant-
manufacturer had originally overcharged the wholesaler for the plumb-
ing fixtures."h
A number of factors combined to make it apparent that the home-
owners in the Plumbing Fixtures case could not possibly have proven
their claims. For one thing, unlike the situation in Hanover Shoe,
they would have had to prove not one, but a series of pass-ons. For
another, the plumbing fixtures which were actually involved in the
alleged conspiracy were a very small part of the cost of the home-
owners' houses. 6
What is particularly significant about these considerations is that,
far from being unique to Plumbing Fixtures, they apply equally to
the gas vent pipe, concrete block, plastic pipe fittings, wall board,
zipper slider, paper label, and other alleged conspiracies charged in
many recent government suits involving substantially similar chains
of distribution, and, of course, a fortiori to the cases involving equip-
ment and raw materials even more distantly removed from the level
at which consumers purchase.77 Virtually all of the courts that have
75. 50 F.R.D. at 25-26. As Judge John W. Lord found:
Each of these steps [represented] activity in a completely new and unrestrained
market. . . . It would be incredible if the price of a house were determined not by
the shifts in supply [and] demand in the market for homes as a whole but rather by
a relatively minuscule change (with respect to the selling price of the house) in the
price of the plumbing fixtures. If the Supreme Court regarded the figures under-
lying corresponding assumptions as "virtually unascertainable" and applied such
adjectives as "insuperable" and "insurmountable" to any attempt to support them
in that case, it certainly follows a fortiori that insuperable difficulties inhere in the
premises underlying the claims at issue in the instant case.
Id. at 26.
76. The maximum overcharge on the fixtures in a typical two-bathroom house was
estimated by the court to be between $10 and $20, while the total prices for the homes
that the class menbers purchased rangcd from $20,000 to $30,000. The court was under-
standably reluctant to believe that, but for a SIO overchange on plumbing fixtures at
the manufacturer level, a builder or former owner would have sold a 530,000 house for
$29,000. Id.
77. Chromite sand, for example, passes through one chain of distribution before it is
acquired by steel companies and used to make molds for steel ingot. The steel then
passes through another chain of distribution before it is acquired by companies (such
as car manufacturers) who fabricate products that consumers purchase. The cars and
other such consumer products all have their own chains of distribution. Hence, for a
consumer to prove injury in such a case, he would havc to prove pass-ons not merely
through multiple levels in a distribution chain, but through multiple chains of distribu-
tion.
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considered the matter agree that in such cases-which account for the
overwhelming mass of price-fixing conspiracies as reflected in five
years of government suits-consumers cannot possibly establish com-
pensable claims3
5
A more difficult problem is presented by those situations where
consumers purchase the price-fixed item itself from an intervening
seller. Although courts have found that the obstacles to proving pass-
on discussed in Hanover Shoe likewise bar consumer suits against
wholesalers of bread 79 and eggs, 80 the court in Boshes v. General
Motors Corporations' took the position that retail purchasers of au-
tomobiles might be able to prove injury resulting from price-fixing
and monopolization at the manufacturer level because they bought
the product in the same form as the defendant sold it and not (like
the homeowners in Plumbing Fixtures) "as a small component or
78. Before the Supreme Court's decision in Hanover Shoe, a number of courts found
the inherent obstacles to proving pass-on to be particularly clear where the price-fixed
item was incorporated into or used to produce another product, rather than the item
itself being resold. Several courts denied defenses based on alleged pass-ons. E.g., Ohio
Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Atlantic City
Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59, 68-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 225 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ill. 1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d
203 (7th Cir. 1964); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826,
831 (M.D. Pa.) (Goodrich, J.), afJ'd per euriam, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 901 (1960). In addition, persons who had purchased the end product were con-
sistently held to be too remote from the antitrust violation to recover. See, e.g., Common-
wealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564, 566-67 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 834 (1963) (denying intervention by Illinois as parens patriae on behalf of
consumers); Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1961 Trade Cas. f 70,143, at
78,557 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 308 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 936 (1963) (deny-
ing intervention by public utility commission on behalf of consumers).
After Hanover Shoe, numerous courts have reached the same result. These courts have
sometimes directly ruled against the claims of remote purchasers. E.g., Illinois v. Ampress
Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 468 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (denying "standing" to "ultimate con-
sumers" who purchased price-fixed concrete block as a component part of finished
buildings); In re Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 310, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(dismissing claims of persons who purchased allegedly price-fixed drugs as an ingredient
in finished animal feed products). They have also refused to allow such claims in a
class action context. E.g., Dorey Corp. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 1975-2 Trade
Cas. IT 60,576, at 67,528 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (excluding from settlement class those who pur-
chased products which merely included allegedly price-fixed dyestuffs as an ingredient);
Bill Minielli Cement Contracting, Inc. v. Richter Concrete Corp., 62 F.R.D. 381, 389 (S.D.
Ohio 1973) (excluding from class indirect purchasers of cement not "marketed in the same
form it was sold by the alleged antitrust violators"); City and County of Denver v.
American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971) (denying class which included indirect
purchasers who acquired allegedly price-fixed asphalt as one item in the contractor's
paving bid). Cf. Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. IT 74,235,
at 93,062 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
79. Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
80. United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
81. 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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derivative of something else. ' s2
The problem with relying on this distinction is that it fails to
deal with the basic rationale for Hanover Shoe-the inherent impossi-
bility of reconstructing pricing decisions in intervening markets.'s The
Boshes court noted that the "retail automobile business is notorious
for its haggling," that "buyers 'shop around' to get the best price,"
and that "[p]rices vary even among identical automobiles sold by
different dealers."84 If, as the Supreme Court held, the difficulties
of proving a pass-on are insuperable even where it can be shown
that the first buyer "raised his price in response to, and in the
amount of, the overcharge, '" s it would be at least equally unavailing
to try to determine whether a particular dealer passed on or absorbed
an overcharge on a particular automobile in the admittedly volatile
and highly competitive retail automobile market. In short, so long
as the consumer is insulated by a reasonably competitive intervening
market, Hanover Shoe itself suggests that there is no basis for dis-
tinguishing cases involving goods ultimately purchased intact by con-
sumers from those dealing with equipment or materials used to pro-
duce consumer goods."6
A number of courts and commentators, finding the disallowance
of consumer claims to be an undesirable and overly harsh result,
82. Id. at 597.
83. Significantly, in In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974), the court recognized and sought to deal with
this rationale by distinguishing Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1970), on the ground that "it]he
court there found that the product passed through several successive unrestrained
markets, with independent pricing decisions at each different level." In the case before
it, the court found no such insulating effect in light of evidence showing that the de-
fendants controlled or were affiliated with many of their direct buyers. 487 F.2d at
195, 198 & n.6, 199. (The court erroneously distinguished the other Plumbing Fixtures
case dealing with the pass-on question, Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), as being of
purely procedural import.)
84. 51 F.R.D. at 600.
85. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968).
86. Judge Miles W. Lord, in In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), reasoned as follows:
[T]he facts suggest that the antibiotic product, once incorporated in the finished
feed, passed through a second market composed of apparently competitive sellers,
obscuring any effect the alleged antibiotic drug conspiracy might have had on the
price of finished feed. The difficulty of plaintiff's case is greatly increased by the
problems of competition, price determination, advertising and merchandising in the
finished feed market, all of which enter into any determination of whether they
felt the impact of the conspiracy.
Id. at 312. Undoubtedly, these considerations are as applicable to the ultimate purchaser
who buys the originally price-fixed item as such after it has been resold, as they are to
one who buys the item as a component of another product or service.
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have criticized the application of the Hanover Shoe rule in the Plumb-
ing Fixtures decision and like cases. 7 The problem, however, is that
none of these critics has adequately come to grips with the hard fac-
tual considerations upon which the rejection of allegations of pass-on
has been based.
Judge Lord's decision has been said to represent an overly "literal"
application in favor of defendants of a principle established by the
Supreme Court for the benefit of plaintiffs.88 One recent opinion
has even suggested that he should instead have interpreted Hanover
Shoe in light of the "result orientation with which the Court has
approached the whole area of private treble damage litigation."8 9 In
other words, according to this school of thought, when Justice White
referred to the difficulties of proving pass-on as "insuperable," he
really meant that they were insuperable for defendants only, and
that somehow a way would be found to allow plaintiffs faced with
the identical evidentiary problems to prevail.90 Not only does this
view manifest a cynicism which undermines confidence.in the judicial
process; it also fails to take into account the solid factual basis upon
which Justice White's analysis rests. The Court's statements of the
virtual impossibility of reconstructing the decisionmaking process by
which Hanover priced its shoes were predicated upon specific ob-
servations about what the Court itself characterized as the "real eco-
nomic world."9 ' Those same factual conditions obviously would have
had to apply to an effort by a consumer of shoes to disentangle pre-
cisely the same pricing decision by the shoe manufacturer (as well
as subsequent pricing decisions by wholesalers and retailers) in seek-
ing to establish a claim.92
87. See, e.g., In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1975-2 Trade Cas. 1f 60,648 (2d
Cir. 1975), and 1973-2 Trade Cas. jf 74,680 at 94,978-80 (D. Conn. 1973); In re Western
Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 196-200 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919
(1974); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 592-99 (N.D. Il. 1973); Comment,
Mangano and the Ultimate-Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover Doctrine,
72 COLUM. L. REV. 394 (1972).
88. In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1975-2 Trade Cas. 17 60,648, at 67,824-25 n.11
(2d Cir. 1975).
89. In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. jf 74,680, at 94,978 (D.
Conn. 1973).
90. See generally In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 196-200 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp.,
395 F. Supp. 287, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
91. 392 U.S. at 493.
92. As stated by Judge Lord in Philadelphia Hobs. Auth. v. American Radiator g-
Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1970), af'd sub norn. Mangano v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971):
[T]he Court [in Hanover Shoe] laid extremely heavy stress on the doubtfulness of the
economic connection between the overcharge and the level of the price charged by
Hanover Shoe, Inc. to its customers as well as the difficulties of proof of such a
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The courts which have refused to apply Hanover Shoe to bar
consumer claims generally treat the entire issue as a question of stand-
ing.93 They accordingly reject the Plumbing Fixtures decision as an
erroneous attempt to insert a requirement of privity into the law of
standing, pointing out (correctly) that such a rule would be incon-
sistent with at least the target area test of standing adopted by some
circuits.9 4 However, the disallowance of the homeowner's claims in
Plumbing Fixtures had nothing more to do with standing than did
connection. These considerations are present of course regardless of whether more
remote purchasers are plaintiffs or not.
93. See, e.g., In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,648, at
67,824-25 & n.11 (2d Cir. 1975), and 1973-2 Trade Cas. r, 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973); In re
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 196-200 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 919 (1974); Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287, 289-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 592-99 (N.D. 111. 1973);
Comment, supra note 87, at 404-12.
The proponents of the House parens patriae bill, H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1975), are apparently under the same misapprehension. The House Report states:
Some courts initially interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), to limit standing to sue to the
first purchaser of a price fixed product. In Hanover Shoe the Court refused to allow
a defendant to escape liability by asserting that his purchaser had passed on any
illegal overcharge to the ultimate consumer. A major concern of the Court was to
prevent the violator from [retaining] the ill-gotten gains of his illegal behavior.
The Court noted that if the first purchaser was denied standing the ultimate con-
sumers would have neither the incentive nor the ability to bring effective actions
for return of the overcharges. 392 U.S. at 494.
1975 REPORT, supra note 36, at 6 n.4 (emphasis added). Thus, the House Report actually
confuses the denial of the pass-on defense in Hanover Shoe with the totally unrelated
issue of standing to sue.
94. The target area test articulated by the Ninth Circuit
focuses on whether the anticompetitive conduct directed against an area of the
economy injured business operations conducted by the claimant in that sector of the
economy. The resulting two-step approach requires identification of the affected
area of the economy and then the ascertainment of whether the claimed injury oc-
curred within that area.
In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1045 (1973). See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964). The Second Circuit has followed and further
articulated this "target area" test. See Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521
F.2d 1269, 1274 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 855 (1976); Calderone Enterprises
Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971). cert denied,
406 U.S. 930 (1972); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971). The result might be different under the alternative "direct
injury" test, which
limits standing to the plaintiff whose immediate contractual or competitive relations
with the violator are of such a nature as would insure that plaintiff has suffered
direct harm. More remotely connected parties are excluded, and their injuries, if
any, are described as remote, consequential or indirect.
Comment, supra note 87, at 397 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Nationwide Auto Appraiser
Serv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967); Loeb v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
For a discussion of the different standards used by the courts on the issue of standing,
see R. Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamnud, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. (June,
1976; forthcoming).
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the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the pass-on defense in Han-
over Shoe.95 Instead, both decisions were based upon a realistic assess-
ment of the evidentiary problem involved and the unlikelihood that
the pass-ons in question could ever be proven.
Such practical questions of the possibilities and methods of proof
are simply evaded in the cases which treat pass-on as an issue of
standing. In the Master Key case, the Second Circuit suggested that
the plaintiffs might be able to prove injury merely by establishing
that there had been an overcharge and that they were consumers of
the product in question,90 apparently not even considering the pos-
sibility that any overcharge might have been absorbed in its entirety
by persons at intervening levels in the chain of distribution. In the
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, the court ducked the issue of how
injury could be proven by relying on the lower court's assumption
that some portion of the alleged overcharge had been passed on to
the plaintiffs.9 7 In Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp.,95 the
95. The defendants in Plumbing Fixtures did not even argue that the homeowner
plaintiffs lacked standing. Such an argument would have been a strictly legal defense
which could have been (and generally is) raised by a motion to dismiss based on the
pleadings. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 855 (1976); Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists
Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). Instead,
the defendants sought to establish through interrogatories that, as a factual matter, the
homeowners could not possibly prove injury. 50 F.R.D. at 15-19. When the plaintiffs
failed to respond with meaningful answers, the court imposed the sanction of assuming
the relevant facts in the defendants' favor and ruled accordingly. Id. at 19. Similarly, in
Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. J 74,235 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
in oral argument on the proposed certification of classes, counsel for defendant Wallace-
Murray Corp. explicitly stated with respect to the pass-on issue:
I don't think [the application of Hanover Shoe] is a threshold question as such,
because this is not a standing question. This is the difference between standing and
proof of injury based upon facts.
It depends on whether you look at the facts or the pleadings.
There is no issue that they have not stated a cause of action in their pleadings.
However, this case is beyond the pleadings stage and therefore the question is whether
their interrogatory answers raise such doubts that they have a claim that they should
not be representative.
Transcript of Oral Argument, at 7-8, Mar. 2, 1972 (emphasis added).
96. In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1975-2 Trade Cas. ff 60,648, at 67,824 n.ll
(2d Cir. 1975):
If the appellees establish at the trial for liability that the defendants engaged in
an unlawful national conspiracy which had the effect of stabilizing prices above
competitive levels, and further establish that the appellees were consumers of that
product, we would think that the jury could reasonably conclude that appellants'
conduct caused injury to each appellee.
97. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 196 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974). The Ninth Circuit used this assumption to distinguish Hanover
Shoe. It noted that the Supreme Court
left open for future decision cases in which the passing on of the illegal overcharge
might be more readily demonstrable. Ours is such a case. Based on affidavits, the
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court merely ruled that the issue of whether the plaintiffs could prove
their claims was irrelevant to the defendants' motion to dismiss, which
was denied on the ground that the plaintiffs were in the "target area"
of the alleged violation and therefore had standing.99
While the question of whether pass-on can ever be proven in any
of these cases thus lies in abeyance, the affidavits referred to in some
of the opinions suggest that the Supreme Court's prognosis of the
futility of such an effort is likely to be borne out. In the Master Key
litigation, for example, Judge Blumenfeld based his denial of the
defendants' motion for summary judgment in part on an affidavit of
the plaintiffs' economist stating that the builders' hardware involved
in that case was sold in a market characterized by inelastic demand. 100
district court assumed that appellants could so show.
Id. at 196 (footnote omitted). The court of appeals then cited in a footnote the district
court's statement that "'plaintiffs . . . can in some instances prove that the increased
cost . . was in fact borne by the plaintiffs,'" and continued:
The Supreme Court spoke of "virtually unascertainable figures" associated with
proof that a particular intermediary "could not or would not have raised his prices
absent the overcharge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been dis-
continued." This was in relation to the liability issue, which in our case is obviated
by the district court's assumption that appellants could prove an illegal overcharge
which was passed on to them.
Id. at 196-97 n.5 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).
In addition, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the facts before it from those involved in
Plumbing Fixtures by pointing out that the asphalt manufacturers controlled through
stock ownership and other means many of the contractors who made up the intervening
level in the distribution chain. The facts in Liquid Asphalt were similar in this respect
to those in Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969), upon which the Ninth Cir-
cuit relied. 487 F.2d at 197, 199. Perkins was a suit under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), in which Standard Oil was charged with giving discriminatorily low
prices not only to certain direct competitors of the plaintiff retailer, but also to a
wholesaler, which resold to the wholesaler's 60%-owned subsidiary, which again resold to
its 55%-owned subsidiary (Regal Stations). Regal was another direct competitor of the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court characterized the passage of the product in question "in
this particular distribution chain" of interconnecting affiliates as a "formal exchange"
which did not affect the plaintiff's right to recover. 395 U.S. at 648. As pointed out in
16C J. VON KALINOWSKI, BusIxEss ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAws AND TRADE REGULATION
§ 31.03[4], at 31-123 (1975), Perkins is distinguishable from "the majority of Robinson-
Patman cases" where
wholly independent companies will stand between the supplier and the ultimate
retailer. In those situations, causation is more difficult to prove, since there is a
much stronger possibility that intervening economic factors other than the dis-
criminatory prices may have caused the competitive injury.
Western Liquid Asphalt is, of course, similarly distinguishable from the majority of
price-fixing cases where intervening levels in the distribution chain are not controlled
by defendants.
98. 395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
99. Id. at 291, 293-94 ("[W]hether plaintiffs can or cannot prove their case at trial is
not dispositive of a motion to dismiss ....
100. The affidavit of Willard F. Mueller, as quoted by the court, asserted that
"because finished hardware components are essential parts of a building and repre-
sent a relatively small part of the total cost of a building, the demand for these
components is very inelastic, i.e., the volume of purchases [is] not affected by price."
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The court's opinion quotes with approval the economist's conclusion
that " '[w]hen demand is very inelastic, increases in costs due to an
overcharge will be passed on in full.' "101 Ironically, this is precisely
the argument raised and rejected in Hanover Shoe. There, the de-
fendant maintained that there could be no injury
where [an] overcharge is imposed equally on all of a buyer's
competitors and where the demand for the buyer's product is so
inelastic that the buyer and his competitors could all increase
their prices by the amount of the cost increase without suffering
a consequent decline in sales. 10 2
Indeed, it was in response to this very claim that the Court made
its much quoted statements about the "insuperable difficulty" of re-
creating pricing decisions "in the real economic world rather than
an economist's hypothetical model."'10
3
While one may sympathize with the reluctance of some courts to
disallow consumer claims, rulings which postpone decisions on the
pass-on issue confer no benefit on consumers if those rulings merely
afford consumers an opportunity to demonstrate in agonizing detail
the futility of attempting to meet their burden of proof. If Justice
White in Hanover and Judge Lord in Plumbing Fixtures were cor-
rect in their perception of the "real economic world"-and thus far
no court or commentator has demonstrated the contrary-then it must
be accepted as a fact of economic life that any injury to consumers
resulting from the vast majority of price-fixing conspiracies which
occur at levels other than retail is inherently incapable of being
proven. 04 Consequently, the proposed parens patriae bills now before
In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. ff 74,680, at 94,981 (D. Conn.
1973), appeal dismissed, 1975-2 Trade Cas. ff 60,648 (2d Cir. 1975).
101. Id.
102. 392 U.S. at 492.
103. Id. at 493.
104. This fact would in no way be altered by the proposed legislation. Indeed, the
pending bills do not even purport to lower the existing legal standards with respect to
proof of injury and damages. As Representative Rodino has stressed:
There is nothing in [the House] Bill that would change substantive antitrust law or
the requirement that damages be proved under established legal standards. The
State would not be able to collect a penny under the Bill's procedures unless it
proves (1) that there was an antitrust violation, (2) that the violation caused injury
to consumers, and (3) the amount of the resulting damages to consumers. The Bill
would let consumers (through their State Attorney General) prove their damages
collectively, but they would still have to prove actual damages.
Memorandum on H.R. 8532, The Parens Patriae Bill, from Representative Peter Rodino
to House Rules Committee, at 3, Feb. 6, 1976 (on file with Yale Law Journal). Similarly,
the House Report on H.R. 8532 stated:
[S]ubsection [4C(a)] creates no new substantive liability. . . . Subsection 4C(a) thus
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Congress are likely to prove a cruel disappointment. The whole ap-
proach for protecting consumers which they embody is predicated
on the erroneous assumption that consumers have viable treble damage
claims in at least a significant body of antitrust suits. Since, as we
have seen, this is not likely to be true even with respect to most
price-fixing cases, the expectations raised by the parens patriae and
class action innovations cannot possibly be realized.
This conclusion is in no way altered by the provision in the
pending bills allowing
damages [to] be proved and assessed in the aggregate on the basis
of statistical or sampling methods, or such other reasonable meth-
od of estimation as the court in its discretion may permit, without
separately proving the fact or amount of individual injury or
damage .... 105
If the problems of proving pass-on are insuperable on an individual
basis, it is difficult to imagine how such difficulties could be overcome
by aggregation, or what statistical, sampling, or estimating methods
would conceivably be relevant to such an endeavor. If there is more
than one level of buyers and sellers in the chain of distribution,
merely showing an overcharge by, for example, the manufacturers
surely would be insufficient, since the possibility (indeed, the like-
lihood) that consumers were insulated to some degree from any over-
charge by the operation of intervening markets would make it im-
possible to infer the extent to which either the class as a whole or
any of its members was injured.
Similarly, a mere showing that prices increased at the retail level
or even at each of the other intervening levels of the chain of dis-
tribution would not be sufficient to prove pass-on. As the Hanover
Court pointed out with respect to the stronger hypothetical case of
an intervening buyer raising his price in response to and in the
amount of an overcharge, a pass-on still could not be proven because
of the "nearly insuperable difficulty" of demonstrating that the in-
tervening seller would not have raised his prices in any event." 3
provides an alternative means to make practically available Federal remedies at law,
previously denied, for the vindication of existing substantive claims . ..
The establishment of an alternative remedy does not increase any defendant's
liability.
1975 REPORT, supra note 36, at 9. See 122 CONG. Rrc. H2065 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1976)
(Rep. Seiberling).
105. S.1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(40)(c)(l) (1975). H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 2(4D) (1975), is identical except that it also provides that "damages may be proved and
assessed in the aggregate . . by the computation of illegal overcharges." Id.
106. 392 U.S. at 493.
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Obviously, expanding the same proof to cover the "aggregate" injury
of an entire class would not serve to cure the defect Justice White
perceived. Indeed, it was just such an attempted classwide showing
of pass-on, based on economists' arguments and statistics, that the
Supreme Court rejected in Hanover Shoe itself.
2. The Multiple Recovery Problem
There appears to be a consensus among all courts that have con-
sidered the matter that the problems of proving pass-on must be
handled in such a way as to avoid duplicative recoveries for the
same alleged overcharge. 107 If, for example, the plaintiff manufac-
turer in Hanover Shoe is permitted to recover three times the over-
charges it paid, without any reduction for subsequent pass-on, then
a different rule cannot be invoked to allow all of the wholesalers,
retailers, and consumers who purchased Hanover's shoes to recover
likewise for three times the same overcharges. To expose a defendant
to multiple recoveries in such circumstances would subject it to, not
three-fold, but six-fold or more damages for a single violation. In
fact, the penalty would vary with the length of the chain of distribu-
tion (each new level adding another treble damage exposure), rather
than the gravity of the offense, thus creating a singularly arbitrary
mechanism for punishing or deterring violators. Such multiple re-
coveries cannot be justified in terms of compensation since, by hy-
pothesis, permitting all of the claimants to recover will allow some
if not most to enjoy full or partial windfalls. 1°s
Accordingly, even those courts and commentators that treat pass-on
as a question of standing recognize that something must be done
either to avoid or to solve the multiple recovery problem. In the
Master Key litigation, for example, Judge Blumenfeld took the po-
sition that the possibility of double liability might be obviated by
107. See In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198-200 (9th Cir. 1973),
ceri. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F.
Supp. 287, 291-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596-97
(N.D. Ill. 1973); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,680, at
97,979-80 (D. Conn. 1973), appeal dismissed, 1975-2 Trade Cas. f 60,648, at 67,825 n.11
(2d Cir. 1975).
108. The Supreme Court discussed the evils of multiple recoveries in Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261-62 (1972). For additional cases relying on the danger
of multiple recoveries as a reason for denying the claims of indirect purchasers, see
Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Balmac,
Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. ff 74,235, at 93,062 (N.D. Cal.
1972); City & County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 631 (D. Colo. 1971);
Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D.
13, 30 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub noz. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971).
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the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 10 Under this theory, if an indirect
purchaser (such as a consumer) established a claim by proving an
unbroken series of pass-ons, the judgment in that case could be as-
serted by the defendant against all subsequent claimants higher up
,in the chain of distribution as conclusively establishing that they
had passed on any overcharge and therefore suffered no injury.110
In fact, this notion has no support in the law of collateral estoppel.
Findings of fact in one action may be used under certain circum-
stances in a subsequent lawsuit only against a party to the first ac-
tion who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the factual issues
in question. 1 ' Therefore, persons higher in the chain of distribution
would not be bound by a prior ruling in another case that they had
passed on an overcharge; indeed, they no doubt could successfully
contest any such assertion by defendants by relying on the controlling
authority of Hanover Shoe.
Another device used by some courts to avoid dealing with the
problem of multiple recoveries is to rely on the statute of limitations
in situations where conflicting claimants are either already barred
or, the court hopes, soon will be barred by their failure to file
claims."1 2 While the court facing the latter situation may ignore the
109. In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. f 74,680, at 94,979 (D.
Conn. 1973). Judge Blumenfeld relied on dictum in Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59
F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. 111. 1973) ("filf the statute of limitations [did] not obviate the
possibility of double liability, the doctrine of collateral estoppel probably would.")
110. Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 n.9 (N.D. 111. 1973).
111. The court in Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 n.9 (N.D. Ill.
1973), cited Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971), for the proposition that collateral estoppel could be used to prevent multiple
recoveries. But Blonder-Tongue reaffirmed the established rule that collateral estoppel
cannot be asserted against a person not a party to the prior action:
Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior action-may not be collaterally
estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a chance to present their
evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite
one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against
their position.
Id. at 329. See lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACricE 11 0.441-.443 (2d ed. 1975).
In Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287, 292 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), Judge Carter noted that the district courts in Boshes and Master Key were wrong
in their suggested application of collateral estoppel.
112. See, e.g., Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287, 292
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[T]he four-year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 15b, may limit the
extent of defendants' liability to some slider purchasers and bar the claims of others
altogether."); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. [ 74,680, at
94,979 (D. Conn. 1973) ("[T]he statute of limitations may limit the extent of liability to
some plaintiffs."); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. I1. 1972)
("ITihe statute of limitations has already cut off the rights of the retail dealers from
whom the plaintiffs presently before the court purchased their automobiles.")
However, the issue of whether or not conflicting claims hale actually been filed has
little bearing on determining how much of an alleged overcharge, if any, was passed on
to consumers. Obviously, the claim of a consumer who in fact was not injured cannot
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issue for the time being, the assertion of conflicting claims must al-
ways be regarded as a real possibility until the statute has actually
run, since it is hardly unusual for class actions on behalf of large
numbers of new claimants to be filed just before the running of
the statute."13 Furthermore, in most cases-particularly where large
amounts of money are at stake-conflicting claims are asserted as a
matter of course either in the same lawsuit or in separate actions
consolidated for pre-trial proceedings, and the courts therefore must
deal directly with the problems of preventing multiple recoveries."14
Significantly, those courts which have declined to follow Hanover
Shoe and Plumbing Fixtures and have instead assumed that pass-on
is susceptible to proof, have also concluded that each overcharge must
be divided up on an individual basis in accordance with what the
interests of the conflicting claimants are actually proven to be. In
the Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, for example, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that damages had to be apportioned among the claimants at
various levels in the chain, with intermediaries (such as contractors)
recovering for those portions of an overcharge they in fact absorbed
and with the ultimate consumers (public entities which had contracted
for the repair or construction of roads) recovering for only that por-
tion of the overcharge actually passed on through all prior levels." 5
be enhanced by the failure of the person who did absorb the overcharge to bring suit
himself. Thus, even if all persons in the chain are not before the court as litigants, many
of them still will have to be brought into the discovery process and perhaps even the
trial to determine whether there was a pass-on to consumer claimants.
113. E.g., City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 44 F.R.D. 584,
586 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969) (class action filed one day before
running of statute of limitations); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42
F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (class actions filed within a week or two of the expiration
of the limitations period).
114. E.g., Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
309 F. Supp. 1057, 1062-63 (E.D. Pa. 1969), afrd sub nor. Mangano v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187, 1188 (3d Cir. 1971) (class actions brought on
behalf of wholesalers, sub-contractors, general contractors, owner-builders, and various
categories of end users); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (class actions brought
by wholesale druggists, retail drug stores, private hospitals, and states on behalf of
themselves and other consumers within their borders); Donson Stores, Inc. v. American
Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (class actions brought by both retailers and
consumers).
Section 1407(a) of the United States Code, Title 28 (Supp. IV 1974), authorizes the
transfer of civil actions involving common questions of fact to any one district "for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings." As several courts have noted, inter-
pleader provides another means for ensuring that all competing claims are before the
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970); cases cited in note 112 supra.
115. Problems of the apportionment of damages, as between an intermediary and
an ultimate consumer, may be treated after liability is established, unless it be clear
that no ultimate consumer was damaged. If an intermediary is shown to have been
damaged by payment of an illegal overcharge which was not passed on to ultimate
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Western Liquid Asphalt did not involve any class actions. In City
and County of Denver v. American Oil Company,"10 however, the
court considered the same problem of allocating overcharges in the
context of even a small alleged class of 126 public entities, and recoiled
at the prospect. It noted that in order to trace an overcharge even on a
simple paving job, the cost of the asphalt would have to be broken
out of the bid and an inquiry made as to the precise extent, if any,
to which that cost influenced the price charged for the paving con-
tract as a whole."'a The court observed that, while the calculation
for the paving contract would not be simple, it would be "child's
play" as compared to "tracing the cost of asphalt into the cost of a
10-mile stretch of new highway blasted out of the Colorado moun-
tains." 8 Describing the ways in which proof of pass-on and injury
would vary from claimant to claimant, the court concluded that
"[t]o try this case as a class action might be an accountant's paradise,
but it would be a court's purgatory."" 19
Not unsurprisingly, in the Boshes case, where the alleged class
consisted of 30 to 40 million persons120 instead bf a mere 126, Judge
Decker came to the same conclusion that the need to determine in
each instance whether an individual retailer had absorbed or passed
on a putative overcharge rendered the lawsuit hopelessly unmanage-
able as a class action.
12
consumers, appellees' liability to ultimate consumers, to that extent, may be de-
creased.
[I]n passing-on cases, the intermediary should recover the amount of the over-
charge that was not passed on, if the proof shows that the ultimate consumers did
not pay it all, and any lost profits resulting from increased costs. The ultimate
purchasers should obtain the remainder of the overcharge, and any other damages
proximately caused ....
. As we have said, the amount of the overcharge is not subject to double pay-
ment, because appellees' liability in that regard is to be apportioned after the
amount of the overcharge is fixed. Further, each plaintiff (including appellants), be
he intermediary or ultimate consumer, will be awarded only such further damages,
including lost profits, as he may reasonably prove allocable to him.
487 F.2d at 200-01.
116. 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971).
117. Id. at 636-37.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 637.
120. Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 599 (N.D. 111. 1973).
121. While this court disagreed with defendant that proof of damage on an in-
dividual basis was not sufficient to defeat plaintiffs' standing to sue, that determina-
tion should not be confused with the question of whether individual questions of
damages are so numerous and complex among class members that the class is un-
manageable....
... [S]everal important factors might either mitigate or eliminate a damage claim
of any individual plaintiff. For example, even if monopolization and pricefixing
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The parens patriae bills presently before Congress are calculated
to increase dramatically the number of conflicting claims with which
the courts will have to deal, since the bills would invite the states
to assert consumer claims in virtually all large antitrust litigations.
For example, while only purchasers of zippers have thus far sued in
the zipper slider case,' 2 2 if the proposed legislation becomes law the
states would presumably feel obligated to protect the "natural per-
sons" residing within their borders who purchased zippers as part
of clothing. In those cases where only the owners of apartment houses
have thus far asserted claims in competition with wholesalers, sub-
contractors, and general contractors on account of allegedly price-
fixed items (such as plumbing fixtures) included in such structures, 2 3
the states may well consider it their duty to try to vindicate the com-
peting claims of tenants.
The problem, however, is that unlike the present class action rule,
the proposed parens patriae procedures would not allow courts the
escape mechanism of declaring the suit unmanageable 2 4 Hence, any
court unlucky enough to be chosen as the forum for a state parens
patriae action would have no option but to adjudicate the claims
brought before it, however numerous and minuscule they might be.
To determine what this would mean in practice, one might consider
that, according to the House Committee Report, the new legislation
is specifically intended to cover the kind of case in which it is claimed
that 50 million consumers have each suffered $1 in damages.125 Since
a case of that magnitude is likely to arise only where the alleged
violation is remote from consumers in the chain of distribution, the
resulting in "excess profits" for GM were proven plaintiffs would still have to
prove that retail dealers passed on the "overcharge" to them. Although on an in-
dividual basis the foregoing would not be impossible, it would be an endless task
on a class-wide basis.
59 F.R.D. at 600 (emphasis in original). For additional cases, see In re Master Key Anti-
trust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. 4 74,680 at 94,979 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court sug-
gesting in dictum that the "insuperable problems of class action management" could
result in pretrial dismissal of claims based on the inability to prove damages); Balmac,
Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. r, 74,235, at 93,063 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
(the class actions would complicate the liability determinations).
122. Carnile Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
123. E.g., In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. f 74,680 (D. Conn.
1973), appeal dismissed, 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,648 (2d Cir. 1975) (certifying a class of
building owners); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nora. Mangano v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971).
124. Fmn. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D) instructs a court, in determining whether "a class
action is superior to other methods" of adjudicating the controversy, to consider "the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of [thel class action." Neither
the Senate nor the House bill contains a similar provision for parens patriae suits.
125. 1975 RxoRT, supra note 36, at 6.
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court, unless it followed Plumbing Fixtures and dismissed the con-
sumer claims en masse, would have to find some way to adjudicate
the rights of 50 million consumers, not only as against the defendants,
but also as against competing plaintiffs at other levels in the chain of
distribution. These other plaintiffs, of course, are likely to claim that,
to the extent there was any illegal overcharge, they, rather than the
consumers, were the ones who absorbed it. The attempt to resolve the
conflicts among the competing claims in such a case will consume
lifetimes of judicial energy126 without any possibility of producing
meaningful recoveries for the individual consumers.
The draftsmen of the proposed bills may hope that these problems
can be obviated by provisions in the legislation for proof of injury
to a class "in the aggregate" based on statistical or sampling methods
or some other "reasonable system of estimating aggegate damages. " 7
But in fact, as we have shown, the problems of proving even the
existence of a pass-on do not become any easier simply by shifting the
focus from the individual to the class; this is true a fortiori if one
proceeds on the assumption that pass-ons can be proven, so that the
problem becomes one of determining as a factual matter what por-
tion of each overcharge was borne by each of the various claimants
at the different levels in the distribution chain. Again, "sampling or
statistical methods" cannot solve the problem. To take the circum-
stances of the Boshes case, convincing testimony by some percentage
or even all of a group of retailers chosen as a sample that they ab-
sorbed all overcharges has no probative value with respect to some
other retailer who may have sold a particular car at a higher price
without absorbing any (or as much) of the overcharge.?2s
In sum, the proposed parens patriae bills would require the courts
126. As Judge Ely stated in In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 89 (9th Cir. 1974):
The appellees' Sherman Act claims, while charging hundreds of hotels with
similar conduct, nonetheless raise individual questions that could require decades
of litigation. . . . In a class of forty million, assuming only ten percent of these
unknown class members came forward with claims, and assuming the proof of each
claim required only ten minutes, approximately one hundred years would yet be
required to adjudicate the claims.
127. H.R: 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4D (1975); accord, S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 401(4C)(c)(1) (1975).
128. In Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 600 (N.D. I1. 1973), Judge
Decker stated in holding that the suit could not be maintained as a class action:
Competition among dealers in the same brand of automobile, in the same "price-
range" or "class" of automobile manufactured by other companies, and within the
overall automobile market varies considerably from one locale to another .... Prices
vary even among identical automobiles sold by different dealers. Prices vary con-
siderably among the various makes, for example, Chevrolet and Cadillac. Hence,
there does not appear to be any way to rationally and fairly distribute any damage
"fund", assuming a violation by GM could be proved.
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to deal with antitrust litigation on an unprecedented scale involving
conflicts between competing claimants and possible duplication be-
tween different types of state parens patriae claims, all without any
guidance as to how the multitude of ensuing problems are to be
dealt with. Since these suits are likely to involve antitrust violations
which actually resulted in no compensable harm to consumers at
all or where, at best, consumers will be pitted in a costly struggle
against other claimants that is likely to dissipate any meaningful re-
covery, one might well question-before the bills become law-whether
the burdens to be thrust on the courts really have any social justi-
fication whatsoever and whether the kinds of lawsuits to be engen-
dered are rationally calculated to serve the consumer interest.
B. Other Types of Antitrust Violation
Of the 346 civil and criminal actions commenced by the Depart-
ment of Justice during the 1971-1975 period, 159 actions alleged
violations other than price-fixing. 129 A consideration of these cases
demonstrates that the more dissimilar a violation is from the exac-
tion of overcharges through price-fixing, the more difficult it becomes
to prove that consumers have suffered any compensable injury at all,
and consequently the more irrelevant parens patriae actions and fluid
recoveries become to any real effort at protecting consumers. 30
Five of the cases brought by the Government during the period
129. Of these 159 cases, nine involved charges of horizontal price-fixing as well and
thus overlap with the 192 cases in the latter category.
In addition to the 192 horizontal price-fixing cases referred to above, four of the suits
brought by the Government over the past five years have involved vertical resale price
maintenance agreements. United States v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. Inc., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. f 45,075 (Gas. No. 2443) (N.D. Cal. 1975) (disposition noted); United States v. Bird
Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. IT 45,072 (Cas. No. 2255) (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (disposition noted);
United States v. Wayne Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,072 (Cas. No. 2239) (S.D. Ind.
1972) (disposition noted); United States v. Nissan Motors Corp. in U.S.A., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. ff 45,072 (Cas. No. 2266) (N.D. Cal., filed June 30, 1972) (disposition noted). Of these
four cases, only the last involved allegations of the fixing of retail prices at which goods
or services were sold to consumers. Furthermore, as a general matter, the economic im-
pact of resale price maintenance on consumers is more problematic than that of
horizontal price-fixing since, by their nature, vertical arrangements do not insulate price
from normal interbrand competition.
130. Both bills are limited to parens patriae suits on behalf of persons injured by
violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (Supp. IV 1974). H.R. 8532, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 2(4C) (1975); S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(4C) (1975). While suits alleging
illegal tie-ins and mergers commonly rely on §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 14, 18 (1970), these types of suits can also be brought under the Sherman Act. See, e.g.,
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (tie-ins); United
States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 655 (1964) (merger). Therefore, we include
in our discussion Justice Department cases alleging these violations.
The "fluid recovery" provisions of the House bill are limited to cases involving willful
price-fixing. H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(4D) (1975). See note 169 infra.
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studied involved tie-ins"l-the sale or licensing of one item on the
condition that the purchaser also buy a second item. In each case,
competitors foreclosed from selling the tied product clearly would
have suffered compensable harm, but buyers could claim to be in-
jured only if they were forced either to buy something they did not
want or to pay more for the tied product than would have been
the case without the tie. While this leaves open the possibility that
consumers who are the direct targets of a tie-in might have viable
treble damage claims, the record revealed by the government suits
indicates that such tie-ins as actually occur in the economy are gen-
erally far removed from consumers in the chain of distribution. In
one case,132 a defendant would only allow its grain elevator in a
given port to be used if the shipping companies also used its stevedor-
ing services in unloading their grain; in another case, 33 several de-
fendant copper companies were charged with licensing their patented
plumbing system only to persons who agreed to build it with copper
pipe. Clearly, it would be an insuperable task to show that the ef-
fects of such alleged violations actually penetrated through all of the
intervening stages of the economy, causing individual consumers some
quantifiable injury.1
34
Some 20 government suits during the past five years involved hori-
zontal territorial divisions (including those resulting from restrictive
licensing arrangements) and customer allocations." 5 The likely ef-
fect of such violations on consumers varies from case to case. For
example, in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., the territorial
division allowed the defendant grocery stores to sell their own brands
131. United States v. Copper Dev. Ass'n, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. j 45,074 (Cas. No.
2379) (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Goodpasture, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,073
(Cas. No. 2360) (S.D. Tex., filed Dec. 28, 1973); United States v. M & T Chemicals, Inc.,
5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,072 (Cas. Nos. 2207-2209) (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 26, 1972) (disposi-
tions noted).
132. United States v. Goodpasture, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. j, 45,073 (Cas. No. 2360)
(S.D. Tex., filed Dec. 28, 1973).
133. United States v. Copper Dev. Ass'n, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. f 45,074 (Cas. No.
2379) (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
134. The other three government suits also alleged tie-ins far removed from con-
sumers in the chain of distribution. In these suits, the Justice Department claimed that
the "defendant companies ha[d] tied the purchase of electroplating materials which
[they] sell, to the sale of nickel to [their] customers." United States v. M & T Chemicals,
Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,072 (Cas. Nos. 2207-2209) (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
135. See 5 TRADE REG. REP. Ir 45,073-75 (1976) (citations on file with Yale Law
Journal). Another three cases alleged vertical agreements allocating markets; none appears
to involve sales to individual consumers. United States v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. ff 45,072 (Cas. No. 2260) (N.D. Ill. 1972) (disposition noted); United States v. Safety
First Prods. Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. f 45,072 (Cas. No. 2245) (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (disposi-
tion noted); United States v. Webster Elec. Co., 5 TRADE REc. REP. f 45,071 (Cas. No.
2161) (E.D. Wis. 1971) (disposition noted).
656
Vol. 85: 626, 1976
Antitrust and the Consumer Interest
in competition with those of the large supermarket chains, and thus
probably increased competition at the consumer level. 136 Horizontal
market allocation schemes may generally reduce competition, but in
many cases the injury is very difficult to measure in terms of money
damages. The problem of proving a compensable injury to consumers
is aggravated by the fact that most of the cases brought by the Gov-
ernment in this area involve companies at the production level (for
example, producers of lithium 37 and publishers of books3s), so that
once again consumers are insulated from the effects of the violation
by persons at several intervening steps in the chain of distribution,
each of whom presumably bought and sold in a reasonably competi-
tive market. While it is theoretically possible that a market division
conspiracy directly affecting consumers might be shown to produce
ascertainable overcharges, few of the cases brought by the Justice
Department during the past five years appear to fit in this category.a 9
Another 22 government civil and criminal actions charged various
defendants with monopolization, attempted monopolization, and con-
spiracies to monopolize 40 under § 2 of the Sherman Act.' 4 ' Some § 2
violations-such as the monopolization of automobiles charged in
Boshes-might be shown to have resulted in overcharges to consumers,
but for the insulation of intervening levels in the distribution chain.
But in most of the government actions the likelihood of showing any
overcharge was further reduced by the nature of the alleged violation
136. 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972):
The District Court determined that by limiting the freedom of its individual mem-
bers to compete with each other, Topco was doing a greater good for fostering com-
petition between members and other large supermarket chains.
The Court declined to consider this factor, holding that horizontal agreements to divide
territorial markets are illegal per se. See id. at 611-12.
137. United States v. Foote Mineral Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ,f 45,074 (Cas. No. 2396)
(E.D. Pa., filed June 28, 1974) (disposition noted).
138. United States v. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. f 45,074
(Cas. No. 2419) (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 25, 1974). For additional cases, see United States v.
Tom's Foods Ltd., 5 TRADE REG. REP. I 45,075 (Cas. No. 2449) (M.D. Ga. 1975) (customer
allocation conspiracy by manufacturers of snack foods); United States v. DeBeers Indus.
Diamond Div. Ltd., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,074 (Cas. Nos. 2425, 2426) (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(market allocation and price-fixing conspiracy by producers of diamond grit); United
States v. Climatrol Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. fT 45,074 (Cas. Nos. 2376, 2377) (S.D. Fla.
1975) (conspiracy among building material firms to allocate sales of screen enclosures);
United States v. Amateur Softball Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,073 (Cas. No. 2359) (W.D.
Okla. 1974) (conspiracy by sporting goods manufacturers and softball association to limit
number of manufacturers licensed to use association's trademark).
139. Of the 20 suits alleging market division conspiracies, only five involved the
division of retail markets. The use of parens patriae in this small group of cases is' sub-
ject to the same problems outlined in Part III below in the discussion of retail price-
fixing.
140. See 5 TRADE REG. REP. f 45,071-75 (1976) (citations on file with Yale Law
Journal).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 1974).
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itself. In several of these cases (such as those involving monopolization
of mobile home transportation 142 and airline routes'4 3), the alleged
wrongdoing related to proceedings before an administrative agency
which was empowered to grant certificates of convenience and neces-
sity and regulate rates, and which quite possibly protected consumers
from any overcharges resulting from the alleged violations. When the
major networks were charged with monopolizing prime time TV en-
tertainment programs, 144 there was again no possible relationship
between the alleged violation and any identifiable out-of-pocket loss
to consumers. Indeed, in many instances (for example, the Justice De-
partment's suits alleging monopolization of electronic components, 14 5
replacement tires, 46 milk, 4 7 and wholesale books and magazines 14s)
an important means by which the defendant supposedly monopolized
was through predatory pricing and the offering of free additional
benefits to customers' 4 -all of which should have had a beneficial
rather than an adverse impact on consumers in the short run, how-
ever harmful the resulting impairment to competition might have
eventually proven to have been over the long run.
Another major category of government antitrust actions consists
of alleged violations related primarily to the defendants' purchasing
function. Twenty such suits have been brought, inter alia, against
various lumber companies charged with conspiracy to eliminate com-
petition among themselves in the purchase of public timber,3 0 against
142. United States v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,074 (Gas. Nos.
2330, 2421) (D.D.C., indictment returned Aug. 2, 1973, civil complaint filed Dec. 5, 1974)
(dispositions noted).
143. United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,075 (Cas. No.
2432) (S.D. Tex., indictment returned Feb. 14, 1975).
144. United States v. CBS, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. Ft 45,074 (Gas. Nos. 2422-2424) (C.D.
Cal., filed Dec. 10, 1974); United States v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. ff 45,072 (Gas. Nos. 2232-2234) (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 14, 1972) (dispositions noted).
145. United States v. Industrial Electronic Eng'rs, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. f 45,073
(Cas. No. 2329) (C.D. Cal., filed June 27, 1973).
146. United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 45,073 (Cas.
Nos. 2335, 2336) (N.D. Ohio 1976).
147. United States v. Mid-American Dairymen, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. f 45,073 (Gas.
No. 2358) (W.D. Mo., filed Dec. 27, 1973); United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. 45,073 (Gas. No. 2312) (W.D. Ky., filed Mar. 29, 1973); United States v. Associated
Milk Producers, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. It 45,072 (Cas. No. 2219) (S.D. Tex. 1975).
148. United States v. Molasky, 5 TRADE REc. REP. It 45,073 (Gas. No. 2345) (E.D. La.
1975).
149. E.g., United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. It 45,072
at 53,461 (Gas. No. 2219) (S.D. Tex. 1975); United States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc.,
5 TRADE RGn. REP. 45,073, at 53,556 (Gas. No. 2358) (W.D. Mo., filed Dec. 27, 1973);
United States v. Industrial Electronic Eng'rs, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. It 45,073, at
53,535 (Gas. No. 2329) (C.D. Cal., filed June 27, 1973); United States v. Dairymen, Inc.,
5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,073, at 53,522 (Gas. No. 2312) (W.D. Ky., filed Mar. 29, 1973).
150. United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,074 (Cas. Nos.
2405, 2406) (D. Ore., indictment returned Sept. 6, 1974).
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firms charged with conspiracy to boycott a particular vendor,'0 ' and
against many different defendants, in a wide variety of industries,
charged with unlawful reciprocity0 2 (using their purchasing power
to gain an unfair advantage in the sale of their products by buying
from those suppliers who reciprocate by purchasing from them). All
of these practices distort competition to some degree and therefore
arguably injure consumers in a general way; however, it is difficult
to see how any of these violations would result in specific, quanti-
fiable injury to consumers as opposed to the vendors and competitors
who are often directly injured. Indeed, many of these practices tend
to lower the costs which producers of consumer goods pay for raw
materials, so that the effect on consumer prices, if any, would be
downward rather than upward.
Finally, 57 government suits during the 1971-1975 period have dealt
with mergers.' 5" Turning first to those involving horizontal mergers
between actual competitors, there is considerable doubt as to which,
if any, of these actual or proposed acquisitions did result, or (if not
enjoined prior to consummation) would have resulted, in any harm
whatsoever to consumers, compensable or otherwise. In many cases'54
after United States v. Von's Grocery Co.'5 and United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., -50 mergers were attacked because they would have in-
creased concentration in a given industry, even though the economic
consequences of such increased concentration were at best specula-
tive.10 7 Even where a clear violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act can
151. United States v. Material Handling Institute, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. RES'. ff 45,072
(Cas. No. 2270) (W.D. Pa. 1973).
152. See 5 TRADE REG. REP. r 45,071-74 (1976) (citations on file with Yale Law
Journal).
153. See 5 TRADE REG. REP. c 45,071-75 (1976) (citations on file with Yale Law
Journal).
154. E.g., United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975);
United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,074 (Cas. No. 2395) (W.D.
Mo., filed June 28, 1974); United States v. Trust Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,071 (Cas.
No. 2169) (N.D. Ga. 1971) (disposition noted).
155. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
156. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
157. There is a singular lack of consensus among economists as to whether industry
concentration has any relation at all to profitability, which is often used as an indicator
of the degree of competition prevailing in the industry. See, e.g., B. BOCK, CONCENTRATION,
OLIGOPOLY, AND PROFIT: CONCEPTS Vs. DATA 32-36 (1972); Brozen, Concentration and
Profits: Does Concentration Matter?, 19 ANTITRUsr BuLL. 381, 388 (1974). The effect of
concentration on price is even more problematical; indeed, several studies have in-
dicated that over the past decade or more prices have actually risen less in concentrated
than nonconcentrated industries. McLaren, Oligopoly and Inflation (II1): The View
From the Justice Department, 4 ANTrITRSr L. & ECON. REv., Spring, 1971, at 94, 99;
Weiss, The Role of Concentration in Recent Inflationary Price Movements: A Statistical
Analysis, 4 ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REv., Spring, 1971, at 109; see Handler, supra note 2,
at 225-29, 267-72 (reporting research of Dr. Jerome Cohen).
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be made out, appraising the economic effects of a change in industry
structure involves so many imponderables that there is no way to
translate a tendency to lessen competition into a measurable effect
on price, much less show a specific impact on individual consumers.
The impossibility of showing compensable harm to consumers from
a merger becomes even more obvious when we consider vertical ac-
quisitionsl 5s and, a fortiori, market extension mergers which involve
at most the elimination of potential competition. 159
In sum, in the vast majority of the Justice Department antitrust
cases currently being brought, 60 problems of pass-on or of the nature
of the violation itself make it highly unlikely that consumers would
be able to establish compensable claims. Consequently the treble
damage action must be recognized as a generally inappropriate vehicle
for protecting the consumer interest.
III. Price-Fixing Cases Directly Affecting Consumers
Only 45 of the 346 Justice Department suits have alleged conspira-
cies to fix the retail prices paid by consumers for goods or services.
The largest single category of retail price-fixing charged by the Gov-
ernment has been in the area of fee schedules and codes of ethics
adopted by various associations of professionals and realtors. No less
158. As recently noted by the Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation of the FTC:
The simple fact of the matter is that economic theory has nothing in it that sug-
gests that vertical integration, either by contract or ownership, is in any general way
likely to injure the interests of consumers.
692 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-11 (1974).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975);
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. First
Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 410 U.S. 577 (1973), afj'g 329 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Colo. 1971);
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. United
States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
160. An additional 29 government suits alleging violations other than price-fixing
involve a variety of offenses in which injuries to consumers are likely to be as uncertain
as in those cases discussed above. These alleged violations include: contempt of a prior
consent decree or judgment, United States v. Work Wear Corp., 5 TPRXDE REG. REP.
If 45,075 (Cas. No. 2469) (N.D. Ohio 1975) (disposition noted); conspiracies not to engage
in advertising, United States v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. RP.
J 45,075 (Cas. No. 2492) (W.D. Mich., filed Nov. 24, 1975); conspiracy to eliminate com-
petition in research and development, United States v. Manufacturers Aircraft Ass'n, 5
TRADE REG. REP. f 45,072 (Cas. No. 2223) (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 29, 1972) (disposition
noted). Finally, three suits alleged agreements among roofing contractors to limit
their guarantees to two years. United States v. Greater Buffalo Roofing & Sheet Metal
Contractors' Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 45,075 (Cas. No. 2473) (W.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 8,
1975); United States v. Composition Roofers & Waterproofers Employment Ass'n, 5 TRADE
REG. REP. " 45,075 (Cas. No. 2472) (E.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 8, 1975); United States v. Roof-
ing, Metal & Heating Associates, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,073 (Cas. No. 2344) (E.D.
Pa. 1973) (disposition noted).
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than 20 of these suits have been brought against groups of lawyers,
architects, engineers, accountants, anesthesiologists, veterinarians, and
(particularly) real estate brokers.16
The fee schedule cases provide a dramatic example of the potential
dangers of parens patriae and fluid class suits in circumstances where
the equities fail to match the preconceived notions of the proponents
of these procedural devices. These cases generally involve small indi-
vidual businessmen and practitioners, not giant corporations. The de-
fendants are not hardened price-fixers; in many cases the legality of
the codes of ethics and fee schedules in question was generally assumed
even by lawyers until the Supreme Court ruled otherwise just last
term. " 2 Finally, it is highly unlikely that any of these groups of de-
fendants has amassed a "pot of gold" by gouging consumers. As one
court noted in approving the settlement of a class action against
certain realtors in Alabama that provided for no damage recovery
at all, in each and every case where real estate brokerage fee schedules
have been enjoined, the effect has been to increase rather than lower
rates.1 3 Therefore, it is doubtful that the violations found in these
cases hurt consumers at all.
161. See 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,071-75 (1976) (citations on file with Yale Law
Journal). For a discussion of the fee schedule cases, see Note, The Antitrust Division v.
The Profession-"No Bidding" Clauses and Fee Schedules, 48 NoTRE DAME L,%,w. 966
(1973).
162. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (minimum fee schedule pub-
lished by the county bar association and enforced by the state bar constituted price-
fixing in violation of § I of the Sherman Act). For cases involving other professions, see
United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950); United States
v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 389 F. Supp. 1193 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975), on remand, 404 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C. 1975) (Code of
Ethics prohibiting submission of competitive bids for engineering services held per se
violation of § I of the Sherman Act).
163. See Brokers' Fees Higher Since Price-Fixing Suit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1975, § 8,
at 1, col. 5. 'hat article noted:
Since 1969, the Justice Department has brought suit against more than a dozen real
estate boards across the nation. All of the cases have resulted in consent decrees
ending the publication of commission guidelines and in higher commissions.
The Justice Department acknowledges that prices-both in the real estate industry
and in other service businesses-have risen in the wake of its price-fixing suits.
Similarly, in Hill v. Art Rice Realty Co., 66 F.R.D. 449, 455 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 511
F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1975), the court stated that:
[iJn both Atlanta and Memphis, consent decrees prohibiting the maintenance of any
recommended fee schedules were entered as a result of injunctive proceedings brought
by the United States of America. [The] affidavits reflect that the impact of the
rescission of fee schedules in commission rates has been in the opposite direction
from what plaintiff insists in his suit, with the rates going up rather than down after
the claimed "conspiracy" had been ended by government action.
According to the Times article, the increases in commission rates were substantial and
immediately followed the consent decrees in the government suits, indicating that the
rise in rates was probably attributable to the removal of the fee schedules. A brokers'
lawyer explained the effect of the fee schedules in apparently holding down rates in New
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Nevertheless, real estate brokers in particular have recently been
subjected to a number of class suits asserting astronomical treble
damage claims, which are particularly shocking in light of the smallness
of the businesses involved. In Kline v. Caldwell, Banker & Co., 10 4 for
example, the representatives of the alleged plaintiffs' class sought to
recover $750 million from some 2,000 Los Angeles realtors (the vast
majority of whom were individuals in business for and by them-
selves) based upon the claimed use of recommended fee schedules in
some 400,000 sales of residential property. In refusing to certify this
class, the Ninth Circuit relied on the requirement of fairness in Rule
23(b)(3).165 In his concurrence, Judge Duniway pointed out that to
allow a class action in Kline would be to create "an overwhelmingly
costly and potent engine for the compulsion of settlements, whether
just or unjust"; most brokers, he observed, are small businessmen who
"cannot afford even to participate in such an action as this, much
less to defend it effectively," and who therefore "will settle for what-
ever amount they can bargain for, and without regard as to whether
they are really liable or not."' 6
Use of parens patriae and fluid class remedies against such defen-
dants could result in the very unfairness which the Kline court man-
aged to prevent. While it is doubtful that the draftsmen of the pro-
posed parens patriae bills deliberately intended to revoke the "fair-
York City by the fact that the New York board was dominated by building owners.
"'Brokers have always had the weakest voice, and attempts to raise fees met resistance.'"
N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1975, § 8, at 10, col. 2.
Whatever the reason for the price increases, it is clear that these suits were brought
against defendants whose prices were lower than those subsequently established by
market forces.
164. 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
165. In Kline, plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of themselves and all other sellers of
real estate in Los Angeles County, against a realty board and a class of real estate
brokers who were members of the board. The court stressed that to permit recovery
would impose joint and several liability for the wrongdoing of the whole class on each
of the 2,000 realtors who were members of the defendant class-a result which "would
shock the conscience." Id. at 234. For this reason, the court could not "find that under
Rule 23(b)(3) this class action [was] superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy." Id. at 235. The principle established in Kline
was characterized as "the notion of fairness to the defendants" in Marks v. San Francisco
Real Estate Bd., 69 F.R.D. 353, 355 (N.D. Cal. 1975). In Marks, the district court applied
this "fairness doctrine" in a context where there was no defendant class and therefore were
no issues of joint and several liability similar to those in Kline. However, the potential
exposure for each realtor was very great due to the "number of plaintiffs and the sum
of their individual claims." Id. at 356. The court concluded that this potential liability
was so large that to permit the class action to be maintained would contravene basic
notions of fairness. But see Knowles v. Tuscaloosa Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 1975-2 Trade
Cas. f 60,501, at 67,815 (N.D. Ala. 1975), permitting a class suit against a group of realtors
similar to those involved in Kline.
166. 508 F.2d at 238.
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ness" doctrine articulated in Kline, they have in effect done so by
failing to provide many of the Rule 23 safeguards. 167 The Ninth
Circuit's holding in Kline was predicated upon the requirement of
Rule 23(b)(3) that a class action be "superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.'
0 8
Since no corresponding language is included in the proposed legis-
lation now before Congress, the courts in parens patriae suits might
be held to lack the power, which the Ninth Circuit exercised in Kline,
to prevent unfairness to defendants.
69
167. One striking feature of the debates on H.R. 8532 was the total failure of its
proponents to come to grips with the problems inherent in the elimination of Rule 23
safeguards. Some Congressmen speaking in favor of the bill seemed to be relying for the
prevention of abuses on the very elements of judicial discretion which parens patriae
would do away with. Representative Badillo, for example, stated:
The issues of potential abuse, class action safeguards, character of notice, mode of
aggregating damages and the distribution of recovery are all issues more properly
considered by the judicial branch. Rules to meet those objections should be
fashioned on a case by case basis.
122 CONG. REc. H2067 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1976). Apparently the Congressman failed to
recognize that, unlike Rule 23, H.R. 8532 contains no provisions allowing a court to
reject parens patriae suits which would result in abuse, injustice, or undue burden on
the judiciary.
To the same effect, Representative Mazzoli characterized the fear of abuse as a "myth,"
citing the fact that the "defendants won" in the Hotel Tel. Charges, Kline, and Eisen
cases. Id. at H2068. What Representative Mazzoli failed to recognize, however, was that
the reason the defendants "won" in those cases was that Rule 23 contains precisely
those provisions allowing a court to reject a proposed class on grounds of unfairness or
unmanageability which are so conspicuously absent in the parens patriae bills. See notes
16 & 17 supra (discussing In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974)).
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).
169. Proposals to insert safeguards in the House parens patriae bill to avoid unfairness
were defeated. See, e.g., 1975 REPORT, supra note 36, at 23-24 (minority views):
The committee rejected an amendment that would have permitted the court to take
into consideration the "defendant's degree of culpability, any history of prior such
conduct, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business and such other
matters as justice may require."
Similarly, as reported in 724 ANTITRUSt & TRADE REG. RatP. (BNA) A-12 (1975):
A one-page substitute bill proposed by Rep. James R. Mann (D-SC) also was de-
feated. It would have permitted parens patriae actions only for price-fixing and
restraint of trade violations and would not have allowed damage recovery for other
anticompetitive activity. Committee Chairman Peter W. Rodino (D-NJ) said the
amendment would "destroy the whole concept of the bill," leaving citizens with
small damage claims as second-class citizens. Other objections to Mann's proposal
were raised, and it was defeated after a short debate.
In addition, see the testimony of David Klingsberg, Esq., proposing that the scope of the
parens patriae remedy be limited to direct and proximate injuries to consumers arising
from "hard core" violations of the antitrust laws. 1975 Hearings on Parens Patriae
Amendments, supra note 40, at 51, 59.
Finally, on the floor of the House, H.R. 8532 was amended to provide that where
damages are "proved and assessed in the aggregate," only single damages may be
awarded against a defendant who "establishes that he acted in good faith and without
reasonable grounds to believe that the conduct in question violated the antitrust laws."
H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 2(4D) (1975). To ensure further that the fluid re-
covery provisions of the bill would be invoked only in cases of clear, hard core antitrust
663
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 85: 626, 1976
In short, while the proponents of the parens patriae bills may have
in mind their application to cases of hard core antitrust violation by
defendants that have unjustly enriched themselves at the public ex-
pense, nothing in the proposed legislation so limits state suits or in-
deed contemplates judicial control to avoid the very real danger of
inequity-a danger which is apparent in the kinds of cases that the
Justice Department and private plaintiffs are now bringing.
17c'
Turning to the remaining 25 retail price-fixing suits, four of these
alleged price-fixing in vending machine sales of cigarettes and soft
drinks;171 four charged local price-fixing conspiracies in retail liquor
violations, another amendment was added making any application of § 2(4D) dependent
on a "determination that the defendants agreed to fix prices in willful violation of the
antitrust law." Id. Hence, as a result of being hastily composed on the floor of the
House, the aggregation of damages provision of H.R. 8532 now contains a totally
redundant proviso allowing only single damages in cases of non-willful violation which
are beyond the scope of the section in the first place. While these amendments would
help mitigate the harshness of the parens patriae procedure, it should be remembered
that the maintenance of a class action was found to be unfair in Kline for reasons having
nothing to do with proof of damages in the aggregate-a proposed innovation which was
not at issue in that case. Thus, the "fairness doctrine" established in Kline could be
circumvented even under amended H.R. 8532 by a state seeking to proceed under § (4C)(a)
as parens patriae, albeit without benefit of the provision for aggregation of damages.
Moreover, the Senate bill still would permit treble damages to be recovered in all
Sherman Act cases with no mitigation in penalty whatsoever for persons who, in good
faith, did not believe their conduct to be illegal.
170. Representative Rodino, in a statement submitted to the House Rules Committee,
expressed the hope that the danger of imposing unconscionable liability on innocent
businessmen for conduct reasonably thought to be lawful would be avoided by the
provision in the bill limiting the availability of the parens patriae remedy to violations
of §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act:
The "innocent businessman" argument ignores the fact that the parens patriae
remedy would be available essentially only with respect to violations of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act (price-fixing, monopolization and other combinations and
conspiracies in restraint of trade). . . . There are, in fact, few if any areas of
business activity where the application of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act is
not clearly delineated by past decisions.
Memorandum on H.R. 8532, The Parens Patriae Bill, from Congressman Peter Rodino
to House Rules Committee, at 2-3, Feb. 6, 1976 (footnote omitted) (on file with Yale Law
Journal).
Unfortunately, this is just not the case. The Kline suit was, in fact, predicated on § I
of the Sherman Act; the defendants' adherence to their association's fee schedule was
attacked as an alleged conspiracy in restraint of trade. United States v. Topco Associates,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), in which cooperative efforts by small grocers to compete with
the large chains were struck down as a horizontal market allocation, was, again, a § 1
case. Indeed, one of the most persistent characteristics of modern antitrust jurisprudence
has been the Supreme Court's continual extension of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act to
new areas of business conduct.
The limitation of the aggregation of damages provision in the House bill to willful
price-fixing, see note 169 supra, is, of course, far more significant. H.R. 8532, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 2(4D) (1975). To obtain the kind of protection for innocent conduct that
Representative Rodino seems to want, however, the same limitation would have to be
placed on the availability of the parens patriae action itself.
171. United States v. Georgia Automatic Merchandising Counsel, Inc., 5 T Aor REc.
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sales in Clovis, New Mexico and Waco, Texas; 172 five charged simi-
larly local price-fixing conspiracies in shoes and women's clothing in
Albuquerque and New York City, respectively;'17 3 eight involved au-
tomobile repair work;174 two charged price-fixing on assembled tour
packages;' 75 and two concerned price-fixing by a group of gas stations
in Jackson, Wyoming' 76  Surveying this assortment of alleged local
violations, almost all involving very small businesses, it would seem
that the proposed use of parens patriae and fluid class remedies here
is likely to be at best unnecessary and at worst actually detrimental to
consumer welfare. The garages, liquor stores, tour coordinators, and
other businesses involved in most of these violations are, after all,
sufficiently small that the fines of up to 51 million provided by
present law17 7 already suffice to threaten economic extinction. To
the extent that parens patriae gives the states the power to extract
REP. If 45,073 (Cas. Nos. 2333, 2334) (N.D. Ga. 1974) (criminal and civil actions against
almost identical groups of defendants, dispositions noted); United States v. AAV Cos., 5
TR.E REG. REP. ff 45,073 (Cas. Nos. 2302, 2303) (S.D. Ohio, indictment returned Jan.
16, 1973) (criminal and civil actions against the same defendants, dispositions noted).
In these cases, the small, unrecorded, cash purchases involved make it difficult, if not
impossible, for many consumers to establish individual claims.
172. United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP.
f 45,074 (Cas. Nos. 2409, 2410) (D.N.M., indictment returned Sept. 27, 1974) (criminal and
civil action against almost identical groups of defendants, dispositions noted); United
States v. Colley Enterprises, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,072 (Cas. Nos. 2257, 2258)
(S.D. Tex., indictment returned June 28, 1972) (criminal and civil action against the
same defendants, dispositions noted).
173. United States v. Saks & Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. f 45,074 (Cas. Nos. 2411, 2412)
(S.D.N.Y., indictment returned Oct. 7, 1974) (criminal and civil actions against almost
identical groups of defendants, dispositions noted); United States v. Wohl Shoe Co., 5
TADE REG. REP. ff 45,071 (Cas. Nos. 2192-2194) (D.N.M., indictment returned Oct. 19,
1971) (dispositions noted).
174. United States v. Northwest Collision Consultants, 5 TAADE REG. REP. f 45,075
(Cas. Nos. 2493, 2494) (W.D. Wash., indictment returned Dec. 3, 1975) (criminal and
civil action against same defendant); United States v. St. Petersburg Auto. Dealers
Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. If 45,072 (Cas. Nos. 2294, 2295) (M.D. Fla. 1973) (criminal
and civil action against same defendant, dispositions noted); United States v. Dunn
Glass Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,072 (Cas. Nos. 2246, 2247) (M.D. Ala., criminal infor-
mation filed May 25, 1972) (criminal and civil actions against almost identical groups
of defendants, dispositions noted); United States v. Independent Garage Owners, and
Athens Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,071 (Cas. Nos. 2156, 2157) (M.D.
Ga., indictment returned Apr. 8, 1971) (lone defendant in criminal action also one of
several defendants in a companion civil suit, dispositions noted).
175. United States v. Hawaii Conference of Tour Operators, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP.
45,075 (Cas. Nos. 2477, 2478) (D. Hawaii, indictment returned Oct. 2, 1975) (criminal
and civil actions involving almost identical groups of defendants, dispositions noted).
176. United States v. Jackson Hole Serv. Station Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. ir 45,073
(Cas. Nos. 2323, 2324) (D. Wyo. 1973) (dispositions noted).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 1974). Congress recently increased the fine for corporate
violators to ,I million from the previous 50,000 penalty. This amendment also in-
creased the maximum possible jail sentence to three years, and elevated price fixing
from a misdemeanor to a felony. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act-Expediting Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974).
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monies from defendants above and beyond the damage recoveries
actually proved by and paid over to individual consumers, it of course
creates a new, expanded form of monetary penalty. Yet the amount
of a fine can generally be varied by a court to take into account
the economic situation of the person punished, the seriousness of
the offense, and other mitigating or aggravating circumstances. None
of these normal sentencing criteria can be considered under parens
patriae.17s
This means not only that the punishment resulting from parens
patriae is unlikely to fit the violation involved in any given case,
but also that the public may suffer by having businesses (especially
small businesses) shut down by excessive penalties, with a resulting
loss in competition, in employment, and in the economic well-being
of the communities affected.' 79 Indeed, since the sample of cases we
have previously reviewed shows that most of the defendants charged
with antitrust violations directly affecting consumers are small busi-
nesses, the cases in which parens patriae suits are not barred by the
impossibility of proving pass-on may well be the ones least likely to
serve the public interest. 180
Regardless of the nature of the defendants against whom these price-
fixing suits are brought, there is a host of other problems with the
proposed legislation. Many of these problems result from the dele-
tion in the parens patriae bills of the procedural safeguards of Rule
23. For example, Rule 23 would allow a court faced with a gargantuan
action on behalf of millions of consumers to deny the class on man-
ageability grounds;181 the parens patriae bills, without changing any
of the substantive rules with respect to proof of injury,18 2 have no
such manageability provision and hence would deprive the court of
any escape hatch no matter how trivial the consumer claims or how
inordinate the judicial effort needed to adjudicate them.
178. An amendment that would have permitted a court to take such factors into
consideration was rejected by the House Judiciary Committee. See note 169 supra.
179. In order to avoid such consequences, several congressional opponents of the
parens patriae bills have suggested that more flexible punitive devices should be de-
veloped. Representative Hyde, for example, argued:
IT]he violation should not go unpunished, but the punishment should be based
upon other considerations other than imposing treble damages based upon a fictional
computation, but also take into account the economic impact a huge verdict will
have on the industry, the likelihood that imposing this measure of damages may
close down the business, put people out of work and accomplish nothing but gratify
the political ambitions of some State attorney general.
122 CONG. REc. H2087 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1976).
180. A proposed amendment that would have excluded small businesses from the
scope of H.R. 8532 was rejected. See id. H2085.
181. FED. R. Civ. 23(b)(3)(D).
182. See note 104 supra.
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In addition, while engrafting some of the procedural features of a
Rule 23 class action on the parens patriae concept (such as notice and
the opportunity to "opt out"),8 3 the proposed legislation fails to pro-
vide such basic safeguards as standards to ensure that there is a com-
munality of interest among the class of persons on whose behalf the
suit is brought; 84 that subclasses of persons with divergent interests
are separately represented; 8 5 that the plaintiff will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interest of those on whose behalf he sues;' 8 6 and
that the plaintiff's claims are typical of those of the class.' 87 Appar-
ently, the draftsmen of the parens patriae legislation fail to recognize
that these requirements are of constitutional dimension. As the Su-
preme Court pointed out in Hansberry v. Lee,188  procedures that
purport to adjudicate the rights of absent parties mark a departure
from the general rule of Anglo-American jurisprudence and are con-
stitutionally permissible only where the interests of those not joined
are "of the same class as the interests of those who are,"' 8 9 and where
there is some assurance that the latter will "fairly represent" the
absent class. 190 If these minimum standards are not met, or if the
representative parties have "dual [or] potentially conflicting inter-
ests," 9 ' the class action fails to "afford that protection to absent
parties which due process requires."'12 Since often not all of the
"natural persons" in a given state will have common interests in a
given antitrust litigation, 93 the neglect in the parens patriae bills of
183. See H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (4C)(c),(d) (1975); S. 1284, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 401(4C)(b)(l), (2) (1975).
184. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2),(b)(3).
186. Cf. id. 23(c)(4).
186. Cf. id. 23(a)(4).
187. Cf. id. 23(a)(3).
188. 311 U.S. 32 (1940), cited by the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23 for the
proposition that class actions are subject to the full requirements of due process. Ad-
visory Committee Note, supra note 3, at 7768.
189. 311 U.S. at 40, 41.
190. Id. at 41.
191. Id. at 44.
192. Id. at 45. Similarly, in Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 14
(D.D.C. 1973), the court noted: "Due process demands that the rights of potential class
members be protected. These rights can only be protected by adequate and proper
class representatives."
193. To take just one example, in any alleged price-fixing conspiracy claimed to af-
fect the price of houses, the first purchaser of a home and any subsequent purchasers
will have conflicting positions with respect to the pass-on issue. Similarly, where the
proof or effects of an alleged conspiracy are different for different time periods or
products, different classes of purchasers may have different interests, for example, with
respect to whether to accept or reject a given settlement offer. In yet another case, some
"natural persons" in a state may have an interest (e.g., as employees) in the survival of
a business threatened by a parens patriae action.
In any case where the "class" of natural persons on whose behalf suit is brought is
split by divergent interests, no single representative, including a state attorney general,
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the legal concerns carefully considered by the draftsmen of Rule
23 may well be constitutionally fatal. The same may be true of the
notice provisions of the parens patriae bills to the extent they offer
less protection to absent class members than does Rule 23.194
The pending legislation raises additional constitutional problems
insofar as it goes beyond the normal functions of a compensatory
remedy and adopts fluid class and parens patriae devices that would
permit states to collect and dispose of damage recoveries based on
injuries suffered by consumers who do not press their individual
claims. Judge Medina, writing for the Second Circuit in Eisen, held
the fluid class procedure "an unconstitutional violation of the re-
quirement of due process of law."' 19 5 Former Solicitor General Gris-
wold persuasively argues that, because the states are not the real
parties in interest, such litigation does not constitute a justiciable
case or controversy within the jurisdiction of the federal courts under
Article III of the Constitution.'9 6
Finally, the bills suffer from the crucial constitutional defect of
conferring on state officials the power to enforce the federal antitrust
laws. Existing antitrust treble damage actions, like other private suits
under federal law, require the plaintiff to demonstrate injury to him-
can adequately represent all absent parties within the minimum constitutional require-
ments articulated in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
194. The pending Senate bill departs from the requirement of Rule 23(c)(2) that
notice to absent class members "shall be the best notice practicable under the cir-
cumstances," and would instead permit notice by publication in a parens patriac suit,
unless a court finds such notice to be "manifestly unjust." S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 401(4C)(b)(1) (1975). As indicated by the Advisory Committee, however, the notice
provisions of Rule 23 are those required as a matter of due process under Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Advisory Committee Note,
supra note 3, at 7768. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974), the
Court cited with approval the holdings in Mullane and Schroeder v. City of New York,
371 U.S. 208 (1962), that "publication notice could not satisfy due process" where the
names and addresses of the class members were known. In providing for a lesser standard
of notice, the Senate bill ignores the controlling constitutional requirements.
The House bill, while recognizing the possibility of notice by publication where
appropriate, incorporates the constitutional requirement that "the best notice practicable
under the circumstances" be provided in each case. H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 2(4C)(c) (1975).
195. 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)
("Even if amended Rule 23 could be read to permit any such fantastic procedure, the
courts would have to reject it as an unconstitutional violation of the requirement of
due process of law.")
196. Memorandum by E. Griswold on Certain Constitutional Questions Arising with
Respect to "Fluid Recovery" Provisions of Title IV of S. 1284 (submitted to Senate
Judiciary Comm. as part of supplementary statement of Allen C. Holmes, on behalf of
the Section on Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association, Mar. 15, 1976; on
file with Yale Law Journal). Griswold goes on to argue that fluid recoveries violate due
process, and, insofar as moneys extracted from defendants are used by states for public
purposes, contravene the Fifth Amendment guarantee against the taking of property
without just compensation.
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self and thus involve the enforcement of clearly private rights.19 7
Patens patriae, by contrast, would allow the states to sue to vindicate
public rights by in effect imposing fines designed to punish wrong-
doers, to force them to disgorge ill-gotten gains, and to deter future
violations.198 In purporting to grant such enforcement powers to
state officials, the pending bills are unconstitutional under the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Buckley v. Valeo.190 There, in hold-
ing that the creation of a congressionally-appointed commission
20 0
empowered to enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act violated
the appointments clause of the Constitution, the Court ruled:
We hold that these provisions of the Act, vesting in the Com-
mission primary responsibility for conducting civil litigation in
the courts of the United States for vindicating public rights,
violate Art. II, cl. 2, § 2, of the Constitution. Such functions
may be discharged only by persons who are "Officers of the
United States" within the language of that section.
201
In support of the proposition that only "Officers of the United
States" duly appointed by the President may be entrusted with the
"administration and enforcement of a public law," the Court relied
on the Confiscation Cases, which established that the Attorney Gen-
eral may discontinue litigation even where private parties are em-
powered to share in the recovery with the United States.20 2 Thus,
in Buckley the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional principle
implicit in the appointments clause that decisions with respect to
the enforcement of federal statutes should be made by "Officers"
of the federal executive branch. In that way, there is some assur-
197. See Clayton Antitrust Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970):
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained ....
198. As we have seen, the whole thrust of the parens patriae bill is to punish and
deter violators rather than redress any injuries to the states themselves or even injuries
to their consumer-citizens, many if not most of whom are unlikely to receive actual
monetary compensation. Indeed, the key difference between parens patriae and existing
class actions is that the former would allow states to extract moneys from defendants
that are not being claimed by the individual consumers actually injured by a violation.
199. 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976).
200. The Commission was to consist of six congressionally designated members (two
to be appointed by the President pro ternpore of the Senate, two by the Speaker of
the House, and, as ex officio, non-voting members, the Secretary of the Senate and the
Clerk of the House) plus two members appointed by the President. Id. at 679-80.
201. Id. at 691-92.
202. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 461-63 (1868). The Court held that the Attorney General
could move for the dismissal of an appeal of an adverse decision in an action to
confiscate a former Confederate vessel, despite the fact that an informer was by statute
entitled to one-half of the recovery.
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ance that such laws will be administered in the national interest
and, if they are not, at least that the officials responsible will be
accountable to the President who in turn is politically and constitu-
tionally answerable for the manner in which federal laws are enforced.
Thus, by giving responsibility for bringing antitrust suits to 50
state attorneys general, parens patriae is likely to impede the effec-
tive enforcement of the antitrust laws. This shift will make it far
more difficult to formulate and implement policies aimed at bringing
those antitrust suits that will have the maximum beneficial economic
effects. It will also increase the probability that suits will be brought
which are harmful to the public interest, since the very granting to
the states of the power to bring parens patriae suits for consumers
will create pressures on state officials to sue in every colorable case,
however questionable the legal or economic rationale for bringing
the action may be.
20 3
IV. A Suggested New Approach
Recognizing that in most antitrust contexts parens patriae suits and
fluid recoveries are likely to provide ineffective vehicles for helping
consumers is, of course, only the beginning of the inquiry as to how
the antitrust laws ought to be enforced to protect the consumer in-
terest. To take the example used in the House Report,20 4 even
though the task of proving a $1 overcharge to each of 50 million
consumers may be impossible and impractical, steps could be taken
to prevent or halt the violation (and others like it) before any injury
was inflicted. That an ounce of prevention in this area is worth
many pounds of cure is so obvious as hardly to be worth mentioning;
yet the effort to protect consumers under the antitrust laws during
recent years has been so one-sided in its emphasis on compensatory
procedures that it bears repeating that our first priority should be
to deter unlawful behavior that significantly distorts competition.
To the extent Congress has addressed itself to the problem of the
prevention of antitrust violations in ways other than as an incidental
203. See, e.g., 1975 REPoRT, supra note 3G, at 24-25:
We believe that politics and antitrust will not make a happy marriage. The tempta-
tions for the politically ambitious to ride into the public eye as its champion
against "fat cat" antitrust violators by filing lawsuits to the sound of political
trumpets may be too great. Since antitrust cases take years to complete, the po-
litically ambitious attorney general need not fear the embarrassment of a string
of losses. In any event, many of the cases will have been undoubtedly settled be-
cause of their adverse publicity and their nuisance value. This bill underscores how
quickly we have forgotten the lesson many thought we learned last year that
politics and antitrust should not be mixed.
204. 1975 REPoRT, supra note 36, at 6. See pp. 652-53 supra.
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consequence of the in terrorem effects of parens patriae, fluid classes,
and other supposedly compensatory procedures, all of the proposals
it has adopted or considered have tended to fall into two categories:
stiffer penalties and more money for the enforcement agencies. Con-
gress recently has raised the maximum fine for Sherman Act offenses
to $1 million for corporations and increased the maximum jail term
to three years.20 5 At the same time, it has increased the Justice De-
partment appropriation for antitrust enforcement, thereby making
possible the hiring of more attorneys and staff and the commence-
ment of more investigations, civil suits, and criminal prosecutions.
20 6
Without in any way belittling the importance of these efforts,
what may be most needed at this point to improve antitrust enforce-
ment is not so much additional sanctions, or even further increases
in appropriations, but rather the introduction of measures to ensure
that the Antitrust Division uses its resources in a manner reasonably
calculated to benefit consumers.
That this is not always the case under present practices is suggested
by the record of government prosecutions we have previously reviewed.
While there is no reason to believe that the relatively low number
of Justice Department suits alleging violations directly affecting con-
sumers does not reflect a general predominance of violations at higher
distribution levels, it is striking that many of the retailer cases that
the Government does bring-such as the fee schedule suits-are often
followed by increases rather than decreases in consumer prices.
20 7
What is more, the Antitrust Division appears to treat the adverse
economic effects of its suits as a matter of considerably less concern
than consumer advocates might wish.
20 8
205. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act-Expediting Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528,
§ 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (1974), amending 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2
(Supp. IV 1974)). This amendment also elevated price-fixing from a misdemeanor to
a felony.
206. Appropriations for the Antitrust Division grew from $12,836,000 in fiscal year
1973 to a total of $27,195,000 in fiscal year 1976. Pub. L. No. 92-544, Title II, 86 Stat.
1114 (1972); Pub. L. No. 94-121, Title I, 89 Stat. 618 (1975). See S. 1136, 94th Cong.
1st Sess. §§ 3 & 4 (1975), and SENATE CONaNS. ON TE JUDICIARY AND COMIIERCE, REPORT
ON THE ANTITRusr ENFORCEMENT AUTHORIZALTION Acr or 1975, S. REP. No. 498, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), which discusses S. 1136 and the bill's enlargement of the en-
forcement budgets of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Bureau
of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission. The Senate has approved S. 1136,
743 ANmrRmusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-19 to A-21 (1975), and this bill is presently
being considered by the House Monopolies Subcommittee. 754 Id. A-4 to A-5 (1976).
207. See note 163 supra.
208. See Brokers' Fees Higher Since Price-Fixing Suit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1975,
§ 8, at 10, col. 4:
For its part, the Justice Department, while conceding that prices have risen, main-
tains that the price level is beside the point.
Joseph Sims, special assistant to the chief of the Antitrust Division, said in a
The Yale Law Journal
In addition, all too often the Justice Department proceeds as though
its primary function were to expand the technical, legal scope of
antitrust to the maximum possible limit, concentrating on novel areas
of application without apparent consideration of the economic con-
sequences or the likelihood that less exotic but possibly more prevalent
and harmful practices-such as price-fixing-present greater dangers
to the public welfare. This approach is reflected in the Government's
merger cases, which have tended to involve smaller and smaller com-
panies and increasingly attenuated theories of the impairment of po-
tential competition 209-which have moved, in other words, into pre-
cisely those areas where the economic effects of a government lawsuit
are most uncertain.
Also indicative of the problems with the Justice Department's en-
forcement policies is the very large number of cases which have
reached the appellate courts in recent years dealing with the appli-
cation of antitrust to regulated industries..2 10 Here the Government
expends precious resources in internecine battles between one federal
agency and another. In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has
rejected the extension of antitrust to a new area (for example,
stock exchange rules fixing brokerage commissions) in order to avoid
disrupting regulatory policies adopted to further the congressionally
established goal of serving the public interest.211 Surely, it is worth
considering whether a more open and disciplined decisionmaking
process prior to suit might not have brought the Department to the
same conclusion on its own-or at least to the view that the question
was close enough to warrant an allocation of resources to the stamp-
ing out of more unambiguous evils.
The need for procedures to ensure better Justice Department en-
telephone interview from Washington: "It is not a matter of determinative im-
portance whether, following any successful price-fixing prosecution, the price goes
up or down. Our interest . . . is to attempt to remove whatever artificial restraints
a conspiracy has placed upon the ability of the marketplace to set its own prices."
209. See, in addition to the cases cited at note 159 supra, United States v. Federal
Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. ff 60,397 (W.D. Tenn. 1975); United States v. Texaco Inc., 5
TRADE REG. REP. ff 45,072 (Cas. No. 2222) (C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 27, 1972); United States
v. National Bank, 5 TP.ADE REG. REP. ff 45,072 (Cas. No. 2220) (N.D. Ga., dismissed
Mar. 21, 1972); United States v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 1974-2 Trade Cas. ff 75,208 (N.D.
Ill. 1974).
210. E.g., Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v. National Ass'n of
Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,
411 U.S. 726 (1973); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Ricci
v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973). For an analysis of these cases, se
Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1975, 76 COLUm. L. Rrv. 191 (1976); Robin-
son, Antitrust Developments: 1973, 74 COLUM. L. Rv. 163 (1974).
211. See, e.g., Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v. National Ass'n
of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
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forcement policies is heightened by the Supreme Court's increasing
adoption of per se rules which keep the Court itself from considering
the economic consequences of its rulings in the Government's favor.
For example, in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,212 the de-
fendants made out an impressive case that the net effect of their ar-
rangement was to permit them to vie for business with their larger
supermarket competitors and thus increase, rather than decrease, com-
petition. The Supreme Court, in striking down the defendants' hori-
zontal market allocations as illegal per se, reasoned that it would go
beyond the judicial function and competence to weigh the defen-
dants' claims of enhanced inter-brand competition against the fact of
decreased intra-brand competition.213 Assuming in light of the Court's
opinion that this is so, shouldn't there be at least someone to make
a determination as to whether a government victory is going to be
good for consumers, competition, and the nation generally? And if
the courts are not going to do that job, then shouldn't the Govern-
ment itself make such a determination based on a reasoned considera-
tion of all pertinent legal and economic factors affecting the public
interest?
There would appear to be a number of ways in which existing
antitrust enforcement could be improved. For one thing, the Justice
Department should be encouraged to bring suits calculated to have
major economic effects likely to benefit all groups (including con-
sumers) interested in the proper functioning of the competitive sys-
tem. Conversely, suits which lack such significance either because of
the small size of the defendants, the limited, local nature of their
offense, or the problematical economic consequences of the violation
in question, should be discouraged.
A second goal toward which Justice Department enforcement ef-
forts should be directed is the protection of the consumer as such.
Thus, the detection and prosecution of violations that directly affect
consumers should be encouraged and, to the extent necessary, funds
should be appropriated specifically for that purpose. In addition, the
United States attorneys in the various judicial districts should be
authorized to maintain continuous grand jury investigations of price-
fixing and other serious antitrust violations that have the most demon-
strable, direct, and adverse effects on the consuming public; and the
present activities of the Antitrust Division in monitoring prices in
various key areas of the economy 21 4 should be further expanded as
212. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
213. Id. at 611-12.
214. See Handler, supra note 2, at 224-25.
The Yale Law Journal
an important early warning system for price-fixing and like violations.
The enforcement policies of the Antitrust Division should also re-
flect the fact that in cases where the numbers of persons injured are
so large and the amounts of individual damage are so small that
private suits are unlikely to be maintained, consumers must neces-
sarily depend upon the Government to protect their interests. Even if
there is no feasible way in which small private recoveries, after ab-
sorption of administration costs, will have any meaningful benefit
to consumers, consumer injury can still be prevented through vigi-
lant and effective antitrust enforcement and especially through suits
for injunctive relief.
There are several ways to ensure that the consumer interest is better
reflected in antitrust policymaking. One is to appoint advisors to
both the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission
who can identify areas of consumer interest and influence the
choice of cases to be brought in a way which maximizes benefits
to consumers.215 Another possibility is to require the Department to
prepare a consumer impact statement setting forth an analysis of the
likely economic impact on consumers of the Department's enforce-
ment efforts.216 Such statements would indicate what portion of gov-
ernment civil and criminal cases materially advance the consumer
interest and expose to public scrutiny cases which do not; they would
also encourage the bringing of the former type of action and dis-
courage the latter.
217
One of the great developments in administrative law in recent years
has been the attempt to increase both the effectiveness and the
responsibility of the various federal agencies through a number of
procedural innovations designed to require administrators to articu-
215. Along these lines, the Department of Justice has just created a Consumer Affairs
Unit "to assist in coordinating the Department's consumer related activities and pro-
grams." The unit will be part of the Office of Policy and Planning in the Office of
the Attorney General. CCH TRADE RFo. REPORTS No. 216, at 7 (Feb. 16, 1976).
216. The function of such "consumer impact statements" would thus be similar to
that of the "environmental impact statements" required under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4347 (1976 Supp.), or the "court impact
statements" which Chief Justice Burger has suggested be prepared by Congress to assess
the effect of proposed legislation on the nation's judicial resources. See Burger, The
State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A. J. 1049, 1050 (1972).
217. By making the Justice Department's prosecutorial policies more visible, such
statements would make possible more meaningful congressional oversight of antitrust
enforcement. Public interest groups would also be provided with additional means
through which to try to influence prosecutorial policies along lines likely to result in
substantial and direct benefits to consumers. Finally, a requirement that policy formu-
lation take place in an open and reasoned manner would provide a form of self-
discipline likely to stimulate and sharpen the planning and prosecutorial decisionmaking
process within the Department itself.
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late the reasons for their decisions. 21S While the function of the
Justice Department is largely prosecutorial, and the discretion of
prosecutors is particularly ingrained in our legal tradition, the de-
terminations made by the Antitrust Division as to what kinds of
cases to bring also constitute an important aspect of our Govern-
ment's economic policies. 19 Hence, it is anomalous for such deci-
sionmaking to be entirely immune from the requirement of open,
reasoned consideration which is the hallmark of our administrative
procedure in so many other areas.220 At the least, this potentially
promising vehicle for improving the quality of antitrust enforcement
for consumers deserves a good deal more of the attention and creative
energy that is presently being squandered on the inherently futile ef-
fort to cure the incurable defects of parens patriae and fluid class suits.
Finally, we turn to such cases as may exist where injury to con-
sumers can be proven and individual damages are large enough to
make a compensatory remedy meaningful, but where, for one reason
or another, it is impractical for consumers to maintain the litigation
themselves. In dealing with such cases, there is no reason for the
federal enforcement agencies to yield to the states their historic re-
sponsibilities for protecting consumers under the antitrust laws. Spe-
cial legislation could be enacted to allow the Attorney General of the
United States to sue under Rule 23(a) as a statutory class representa-
tive on behalf of consumers in those cases where he finds that the
consumers' claims are significant enough to justify the burden which
the suit would impose on the judicial system. In such an action, the
court should be empowered to determine not only whether there was
an antitrust violation, but also the nature and extent, if any, of the
injury to consumers resulting from the defendants' conduct. The
court could then, as part of its judgment, lay down rules governing
the measurement of consumer damages where the individual con-
sumer has suffered cognizable injury.
218. See, e.g., Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. RE-v. 1267, 1292 (1975).
219. Limitation of the discretion of prosecutors generally has been a subject of in-
creasing comment in recent years. See, e.g., Note, Reviewability of Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion: Failure to Prosecute, 75 COLUmt. L. Rv. 130 (1975).
Congress recently enacted requirements that Justice Department consent judgments
under the antitrust laws be preceded by the publication of a "competitive impact state-
ment" and a 60-day period for the receipt of public comments. The statement and
comments are subject to judicial review for a determination of whether the consent
judgment "is in the public interest." Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(b)-(h) (Supp. IV 1974). Since such elaborate procedures are required for the De-
partment to settle a lawsuit, at least some safeguards should be imposed at the po-
tentially far more important point when it decides whether to begin one.
220. For example, in order to help its staff members evaluate how proposed legal
proceedings would aid consumers, the FTC has adopted a program of policy protocols
The Yale Law Journal
At that point, the adjudication of individual consumer claims should
pass from the courts to an administrative body, such as the Federal
Trade Commission. The agency should be empowered to award
damages in a manner consistent with the court's findings, but only to
individual consumers who comply with whatever simplified procedures
the agency prescribes within congressionally mandated guidelines. The
procedure should be sufficiently simple, however, so that a layman
could present his own claim to the agency without having to retain
an attorney. While consumers whose claims are not sufficiently large
to make it worth their while to comply with even such minimal re-
quirements would, of course, receive no recovery, those consumers
whose claims were sig-nificant would receive their entire treble dam-
age recovery without deduction for attorneys' fees or for the large
costs of administration which would erode individual claims in the
proposed legislation.
221
There are a number of advantages to this suggested procedure.
While preserving the fairness and manageability safeguards of Rule
23, it would allow a broader range of consumer class actions to be
brought than at present. The cost of notice to class members would
be borne by the federal government, and the FTC procedure for
distributing damages would relieve the courts of a major source of
manageability problems. The beneficiaries of such litigation would
be the consumers who are actually injured rather than the lawyers
who all too often are the only ones who profit from a class suit. The
approach suggested here would assure consumers of skilled, adequate-
ly financed representation in every meritorious case where a treble
damage remedy is appropriate. Combined with measures to improve
the efficacy of antitrust enforcement from the consumer standpoint,
it would accomplish the legitimate objectives of the legislation cur-
rently pending in Congress while avoiding the practical and consti-
tutional obstacles which, as of now, make it highly unlikely that
parens patriae will ever prove to be a truly effective consumer remedy.
which consist of a series of questions addressed to the staff member. Two of these are
now in use in the area of deceptive trade practices, and seven antitrust protocols are
planned for the future. 753 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-19 to A-20 (1976).
221. Under the Senate bill, outside counsel may be retained on a contingency basis,
which typically means that the attorney will receive a substantial percentage of the
consumers' recovery. While contingency fees are not permitted under the House bill,
H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (4G)(1) (1975), counsel fees paid out of any settle-
ment recovery would reduce the amount of money available for consumers. See 122
CONG. RFc. H2086 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1976) (Rep. Wiggins).
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